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Democracy in the international system: some implications of a theoretical model

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DEMOCRACY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: SOME IMPLICATIONS OF A THEORETICAL MODEL

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PREFACE

In The True Believer,[1] Eric Hoffer convincingly demonstrated that the dangers of fanaticism were substantially independent of the ends pursued. This did not mean that the end was unimportant to the success of a mass movement for, in fact, it probably is the most important motivating factor. However, the nature of the end does not in and of itself change the fact that misguided proselytizing for "good" causes can bring about as much damage and suffering as the "evil" actions of those bent on conquest and rapine. It was considered "good," for example, for the United States to drive Indians onto reservations, for Christians to launch crusades against the infidel Turk, for America to wage war against Mexico in 1846 and against Spain in 1898, and for Alexander to conquer the world. Such characterizations, however, are not and were not objectively derived.

Similarly, through the eyes of persons brought up in the American cultural environment, it was "bad" for Sparta to attack Athens, for Rome to fall to Barbarians, for the Turk to threaten Europe, for Spain to seek dominion over the New World, and so forth.

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[1] Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Mentor Books, 1951, 1958).

In either case, "good" or "bad" was a label determined in large part by emotion, cultural or historical context, and a propensity for people to see things the way they would like them to be. Thus, today, the notion that somehow the world can and should be made over in a democratic image has no less potential for causing heartache and suffering.

Nonetheless, this fact does not alter the possibility that democracy may have something to offer all the peoples of the world. And while the possibility surely does not justify proselytizing, it does demand that those who have known and experienced democratic self-government offer an intelligent explanation of its theoretical basis. This obligation to accurately describe the theoretical foundations of self-government is regarded by the writer as the outstanding challenge to democracy.

THE CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY

The proliferation of weak, poor and unstable nation-states in the years following World War II has starkly illustrated the inadequacy and insufficiency of theoretical knowledge relevant to the processes of building: (1) democratic national societies and (2) stable democratic governments. Moreover, it is equally apparent that this inadequacy and insufficiency of democratic theory extends to the international arena as well; for the

relationship of the international structure to the idea of democracy is imprecise, vague and ambiguous.

Yet, if the idea of democracy has universal validity, to be a relevant alternative it must be illuminated in a manner that explains why some societies can support stable self-government, while others, attempting it, have reverted to elitism, autocracy, or worse; likewise it must be determined in what way the concept of democracy has relevance to the international community.

If these explanations are not clearly and concisely made, democracy will ever remain a unique, non-transplantable commodity which is doomed by its inability to compete either evangelically as a source of ideological satisfaction or objectively as a means of meeting concrete social needs; and the international arena will continue as a hostile, suspicious environment.

The need for such explanations is all the more compelling because, in the writer's opinion, many of the most vocal spokesmen for democracy have been inept witnesses. Believers in that form will recall that an over-optimistic Tom Paine preached of a democracy that was utopia and that the leaders of the French Revolution equated the eradication of tyranny with the fulfillment

of freedom.[2] In the light of all that has passed since those early years, those of us for whom democracy is the guarantor deserve to have that blessing better explained, better understood and better implemented by the leaders and spokesmen of today. If this is not done, the blessing will become the curse and the word democracy will simply become the rallying cry of the extremist and the chant of the mob.

In fact, one could in effect equate democracy to communism by stating utopian conditions for the survival of the former, even as Marx did for communism a century ago. To draw the parallel further, consider the not uncommon observation that the laudable but utopian ends of communism had their origin in an atmosphere of deep compassion for the desperate social and economic condition of Western workers and in the teachings of Christianity; thus, it is not those ends which are false. Rather, it is, principally, the independent belief that communism can only be

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[2] "In 1791 Thomas Paine, one of the world's great publicists described the accomplishments of the French Revolution as follows: 'Monarchical sovereignty, the enemy of mankind, and the source of misery, is abolished; and sovereignty itself is restored to its natural and original place, the nation.' The consequence of this in international relations Paine indicates in the succeeding sentence. 'Were this the case throughout Europe,' he asserts, 'the cause of war would be taken away.' Democracy is preeminently the peaceful form of the state. Control of policy by the people would mean peace." Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, The State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 101.

sustained if the entire world is totally transformed. It is this belief that has given such drive to the related conviction that until this is brought about nothing that is tactically expedient is either immoral or beyond the realm of "sober" consideration.[3] In the meantime, the rest of the world has had to endure in frustration the consequences of this misconceived notion. And, while it can be said with certainty that the day will never dawn on a communist utopia, it is equally certain that Communist pursuit of that goal will not soon be abandoned.

On the other hand, democracy could be similarly misconceived; and the capacity of that error for abusing the rest of humanity in the name of that misconception would be both serious and tragic. For this would imply a faith in democracy so shallow as to require that tyranny be totally destroyed before the world could be "safe for democracy." Of course, the world can never be safe for democracy, but nevertheless, pursuit of that end could lead to extremes of means that would do great

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[3] While communist conservatism, caution, and pragmatism may be evident in policy and action, the ideological commitment seems to remain. At the least, it produces considerable tension and suspicion; at the extreme, it may remain a long-term objective.

violence, not merely to unfortunate individuals, but also to the Greco-Roman-Hebraic and Christian heritage which is called Western Civilization, and of which we have such justifiable right to be proud.

What too often is not apparent is that if neither the spokesmen for communism nor those for democracy are sufficiently capable of coming to grips with an imperfect world, nor capable of being sustained with partial successes, then both are false prophets. In the case of democracy, this need not be.

FOREWORD

SOME ASSUMPTIONS AND VALUES[1]

The model discussed in this paper is directed towards the social and political problems of man which, though occurring in a material world of precise physical and mathematical relationships, are, nonetheless, the sole result of man's reactions to the fact of his existence. No argument is made with respect to why these reactions occur, nor is it held that their causes and effects can be exactly determined.[2] Rather, it is accepted that these reactions are related to human nature and that human nature, whatever it is, is a fact to be taken account of, not to be altered to accord with an idea or a vision as to what it should be.[3]

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[1] The assumptions and values discussed in this foreword are in the nature of premises which are thought to be required to support the theoretical model presented in Chapter III. No pretense is made that the discussion is a definitive treatment of questions which have been argued for thousands of years. The discussion is merely intended to show an awareness of the relevance of these questions and how the author has taken account of them in the development of his argument.

[2] As, for example, was implicit in the approach of many of the earlier political philosophers in assuming that man was by nature disposed to be selfish (Machiavelli), to seek power (Hobbes), or to be good (Rousseau).

[3] Many movements have sought to change the way in which man is otherwise supposed to act: Christianity, communism, the cultural revolution in China are notable examples.

Human Nature

It should be evident from man's extraordinarily diverse pursuits of interests that his likes and dislikes are exceedingly complex; that human nature, as the mechanism for translating a stimulus -- whatever its source -- into a response, is far beyond man's ability to precisely explain. Disentangling the intertwined causes and effects is itself so much a matter of human judgment that the effort more properly belongs in the world of art or metaphysics than of science. Thus psychology in the medical sense of the term is a poor approach to the ills of society just because of its focus on the individual and because of its attempt to be precise in terms of an individual's unique cause-effect pattern. Even if it were possible to acquire human nature profiles for every living person, it is impossible that such a mass of diverse data could be acted on for political benefit.

However, the "psychology" with which the political scientist is concerned is a different matter. While it may utilize the terms of the psychologist, it does not attempt to know the individual at all, but instead merely analyzes and classifies his actions in human patterns that appear to have empirical validity so far as group behavior is concerned. This service is worthwhile if it provides some social and political insight to those concerned with

government. Of course, this type of "psychology" is really a mixture of sociology, political science and philosophy with psychology.

Thus human nature, the classic starting point of the political theorist, is an artificial model in no way resembling that which is treated by the psychiatrist. This political human nature is a convenient means of organizing and classifying data which are apparently the consequences of some three billion real and quite individual human natures. For example, "the will to power" and the "will to live truly" of Reinhold Neibuhr represent a dichotomy which is useful to the politician but far too vague to help in the treatment of a sick individual. Similarly, rational-irrational, spiritual-material, social-non-social, good-evil, etc., are useful in treating with social groupings; they do not, however, accurately diagnose the functioning of an individual's psyche. They are gross terms applicable to a synthetic or group human nature.

What is maintained, then, is that human nature is only relevant, in the social and political realms, in its consequential manifestations. By this it is meant that while it is absolutely essential to know as much as possible about man's interests -- which is the term that will be used to describe the consequences

of his nature after they have become conscious to him -- it is not necessary to explain how a person's individuality transforms a stimulus into a response (interest). In other words, the proper aim of politics is to contain or take account of the gross effects of human nature by erecting a unifying structure within which the diversity of human nature can be expressed.

The Nature of Truth

The emphasis on consequences of human nature rather than cause-effect relationships reflects a somewhat relativistic outlook; moreover, it appears to reject the belief that truth and ultimate truth are one and the same and that such knowledge is a prerequisite to universal harmony.[4] But while some violence is done to the latter, the former belief is not necessarily contradicted; it is simply put into a perspective more in harmony with the pragmatic requirements of an effective political structure.

Is truth simply a statement of cause and effect, absolute

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[4] There are said to be three general approaches to defining truth:

a. that truth is completely objective and revealed,
b. that truth is completely objective but incompletely revealed or perceived (the Socratic belief).
c. that truth is related to feeling or to perception only and that it is completely subjective.

The discussion in this section is intended to identify with definition "b" even though references to relativisim may seem to indicate a subjective treatment.

and inflexible? Or is it that which is revealed as a consequence of living? The former is ultimate, the latter relative. But it does not follow that there is an essential difference. What is at issue is the pretense that ultimate truth in all its fullness can be revealed to man and the utopian assumption that a tolerable life on earth requires such knowledge.

It is generally agreed that human knowledge, while immense and expanding, is incomplete and probably minuscule in relation to that which remains to be discovered. People live, and always have lived, pursuing truth by acquiring knowledge; yet to what does this acquisition lead? Is life getting better in terms of value realization? And if the answer is affirmative for some individuals -- say in the United States -- how is this related to the quantity of truth? (Since truth is itself supposed to be a qualitative absolute, absolute truth must refer to the quantity of truth revealed). Surely there is no reasonable prospect for a worldly existence founded on ultimate truth.

But, like human nature, which can only be known through its consequences, politicians should not find such a deficiency in knowledge a bar to effective government. For again the problem is one of erecting a structure which takes untruth into account by feedback which serves to correct and to compensate for its disintegrative effects. Truth, then is tentative; it is

synonymous with that which is generally and responsibly regarded as truth. It is, or should be, subject to modification to take into account new discoveries.[5] In short, truth can be said to be an expression consistent -- up to the moment of its utterance -- with the totality of human knowledge at that time; it will be ultimate only at such time as human knowledge is complete.[6]

The implication of the foregoing, that the truth man knows now is not necessarily the truth that man will know, is surely wretched if one has placed his hopes for man's future in the steady accumulation of objective bits of truth, or in theological

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[5] Particularly in the area of social theory: for example, what is the relationship of job training and income maintenance to the breaking of the poverty cycle? Can civil rights legislation achieve the integration of minority groups into the life and actions of society?

[6] The debt to cybernetics is obvious: government is a system, it is purposeful, and it is dynamic; thus it is subject to control theory. There is no need for a government to always make the "right" or "correct" decision in an objective sense. What is important is that decisions be made on the basis of what is thought to be correct at the time with the realization that revision and refinement undoubtedly will be necessary; or, that decisions knowingly be made for experimental purposes with the knowledge that the underlying truth just is not known. An excellent discussion of cybernetics is contained in Norbert Weiner, Cybernetics (2nd ed.; Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1961), Chapters IV and X; see also Stafford Beer, Cybernetics and Management (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959), pp. 28-57.

revelations of truth. The implication cannot be avoided. Truth is related to experience; it is as much a human creation as it is a human discovery. Truth may be objective but at any one instant it cannot be described as more than what one takes it to be. While this is relativism, it is not meant to imply that truth is subjective. It is only to take note of the fact that because man is the agent through which truth is exposed, knowledge of the truth must of necessity remain relative to his intellectual activity.[7]

This paper leans heavily on the concept of a functional truth that expands and revises itself in direct correspondence with man's intellectual activity.[8]

Good and Evil

The two extreme arguments with respect to good and evil are (1) that morality is a requirement imposed on man by a higher source independent of man's social and political condition; and (2) that morality is a product of man's social condition.[9]

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[7] For society but not necessarily for the individual since he may reject any new truth which contradicts or seems to require revision of that which he already "knows."

[8] See footnote 4. Truth is relative only by virtue of man's inability to perceive it clearly. This differs from subjective concepts of truth which might also be thought of as relativistic.

[9] These two extreme positions identify, respectively, with the Stoic doctrine of natural law as stated by Cicero in his Republic and the positivist refutation as argued in David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature.

The first argument is the natural law doctrine and its implications are (1) that there is one standard of morality applicable to all of mankind whether or not they all are members of the same society and (2) that what comprises the body of natural law can be inferred through correct or right reasoning. In practice it requires skilled interpreters with the power to propagate their findings if it is to have effect. But because these interpreters are humans whose especial qualifications are subject to challenge, natural law -- even when it recognizes gradations between the fixed and universal and the changing and particular -- is of greater value to the philosopher than to the pragmatic political scientist.

The second argument is termed positivism. It argues that as a result of his experience in society man has created morality. Thus it is more flexible in allowing for differences in moral standards where two or more different societies are concerned. And because it is held that morality is a social creation rather than a fixed law, it is amenable to "legislation" of differences whereas the logic of natural law forces it to proselytize. Thus, positivism is inherently the more politically oriented of the two doctrines and it is obviously the perspective from which this paper is written. Of course, neither the substance of morality nor its durability necessarily is different, within a society,

regardless of its supposed origin.

As to whether man is disposed to good or evil, to both, or to neither it is important to reaffirm that it is the consequences of human nature with which the author is concerned. To take a position one way or the other is unnecessary and is certain to invite controversy. The fact is that a sufficient number of the consequences of human nature are visible as to afford a reasonably accurate guide for political purposes. Thus there exists an unbroken record wherever history has been recorded which reveals that whether or not it is because of his nature or in spite of it man just the same has the capacity for both good and evil -- in terms of his own standards at the time of his actions.

Whether or not good and evil are absolute or relative is subject to debate and is an argument which cannot be answered to everyone's satisfaction. What is important is the knowledge that man is the agent for perceiving good and evil and, for better or for worse, good and evil must remain what he thinks they are; some disagreement is inevitable and it is a function of political systems to reconcile different points of view, legislating if necessary. What constitutes good and evil is absolutely vital to society; why something is good or evil is not important from a political point of view since lack of such knowledge does not impede the ability

to govern.

One need not say that there is no such thing as an ultimate standard or set of values by which good and evil are determined. However, one must regard as suspect any claims for a particular listing. If such values gain acceptance within society or between societies they in effect become socially determined norms and can be factors of unity and cohesion and their origin is of no consequence. However, if projected unilaterally into the non-social vacuum between societies, the values would find no regular institution by which acceptance could be reliably decided. The issue of right or wrong, good or evil could only be decided by such means as were at hand -- which in the extreme instance could mean force.[10]

Perfection and Imperfection

Interwoven with man's concepts of good and evil are his concepts of perfection -- or imperfection. For example, there is the idea that the world man lives in is imperfect; that man is imperfect, that his creations are imperfect. The thought has given solace to many; to an equal number it has been a source of

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[10]This, of course, was the situation existing between states which led Grotius in 1625 to develop a positivist international law to go with an internal natural law doctrine. (In De jure belli ac pacis, 1625).

frustration. Another idea is that imperfect though the world may be, man and his rationality can create a world that is perfect. This idea has given great drive to individuals and masses alike. Both ideas are misconceived.

The belief that there is imperfection in the world or in man depends on an implicit assumption that criteria for perfection exist. Yet if perfection is achievement of the ultimate good then it must be defined so that it can serve as a goal; but again there is the problem of who is to define this ultimate good in the interval between the imperfect present and ultimate perfection.

In sum, the implications of the perfection-imperfection concept are (1) that the ultimate good can be achieved on earth or (2) that human existence is essentially an imperfect experience and will remain thus. Optimism clashes with pessimism, fools with cynics and to what end? Concepts which compare man's performance with a standard of perfection merely enslave the human mind and do mischief to the political process.

Man is obviously imperfect in the sense that he falls short of his own standards but the political world can well do without the comparison of man's conduct to a standard of

perfection.[11] The political world is what man makes of it and it is the process of doing and making that constitutes human history. Justice and injustice are better concepts to serve man's relativistic needs.

Justice and Injustice

Can justice be done? Or is this too an illusion created in the confusion of the ultimate with the present?

Many believe that justice can be objectified and dispensed to all of mankind. And perhaps they are right if the definition of that which comprises justice can be watered down and kept within narrow limits.

But the human record suggests that justice is regarded as something else. It is not something fixed and unchangeable. What is held to be just seems always to be changing. Legal justice is pursued closely by social and economic justice; and what constitutes each seems to be relative to the state of political or social or economic development within a society. Laws are standards of justice and it is worth noting that in

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[11] Cf, Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), "Perfectionism and Utopia," pp. 51-68. This chapter starts with the thought that "If democracy is threatened from without by realists, it is even more seriously threatened from within by perfectionists..."

societies beyond the traditional stage laws are constantly being changed.

Justice is then the ability of a society, first, to conceive of that which is just and, second, to pursue it continuously and effectively. Thus no society can ever be satisfied that it has fulfilled itself. It is enough that it is seeking to eliminate the uneven distribution of social values and that it is creating new standards and new methods by which uneveness can be eliminated or reduced.

Justice is, then, something of a tautology: it is the elimination of injustice. It is not in the achievement but in the pursuit that justice is found. The unequal distribution of social values can never be completely eliminated; but the just society does have the capacity of recognize injustice and the equally important capacity for peaceful change.

How a society pursues peaceful change raises the question of ends and means.

Ends and Means

No aspect of society has been more troublesome than the relationship of ends to means. Nicollo Machiavelli had perhaps as clear an understanding of it as any political theorist who has limited himself to the examination of the consequences of

human thoughts and actions. But he was, and still is, greatly misunderstood; also his words themselves are misleading: "It is well that, when the act accuses him, the result should excuse him,"[12] he advised his readers. Yet this cannot be boiled down to the simple proposition that the ends justify the means, nor did he have in mind so simple a message.

Ends and means are related within society by the values, laws and institutions of that society; in extra-social situations -- that is, for example, between societies where there is neither a common value system nor common institutions of peaceful change -- they are not. In other words, within society social ends are pursued by legal means. This means, first of all, that such a society has a value and political system by which it can identify that which is a legitimate, or social, goal and, second, that the society regulates or restrains itself so that in pursuing its goals it does not damage or destroy its own value system. In short, the means are "legal."

But in an extra-social situation such as existed between nation-states prior to the mid-seventeenth century, such a relationship is impossible. In fact, not only the value systems of the

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[12]Nicollo Machiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses (New York: The Modern Library, 1940), p. 139. (Discourses, Bk I, 9).

respective societies may be in jeopardy but also the existence of the societies themselves. Customs applicable to such confrontations have indeed arisen and by their existence an inchoate social condition can be said to exist. For example, diplomacy, custom, and international law plus the several states are said to constitute the international system.[13] But the very facts that the community is inchoate and that certainty of justice is missing makes it necessary for the separate states to supplement that which exists with whatever their wit and resources can provide. What is a social good for one society is often a social evil for another. And standards of legality within one society may, if applied extra-socially, jeopardize the other society's existence. Thus, in this situation, necessary ends must be regarded as justifying such means as ensure them.[14]

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[13] See footnote 10. Following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the acceptance of state sovereignty and international law a partial and inchoate relationship was established. The rudimentary nature of the system, however, still required war as a means of reconciling differences. See Whittle Johnston, "Little America - Big America," The Yale Review (Autumn 1968), pp. 3-10.

[14] Machiavelli employed a similar qualification: "...In the actions of men, and especially of princes, from which there is no appeal, the end justifies the means," (Emphasis supplied.) The words "from which there is no appeal" are a direct reference to the extra-social relationships which characterized the interstate relations of Italy of that period. Op. cit., p. 66. (The Prince, Ch. 18).

This does not end the matter, however, for in practice societies do tend to project their internal values into the extra-social vacuum. And if their respective value systems are similar it is possible to foresee a bilateral modus vivendi resulting. If not, the differences may lead to confrontation and conflict, with no satisfactory mechanism or institution to aid in their resolution.

However, while societies have historically failed to reach meaningful agreement on extra-social means,[15] they still have found autolimitation of their actions expedient for several reasons:

First, the habit of self-limitation acquired by officials as a result of their experience living within a domestic social system. This may include the feeling that there exists a quasi-international value structure even though it is unaccompanied by formal institutions.

Second, the uniqueness of the occasion and the unfamiliarity of most officials with inventing "appropriate" extra-legal means for an extra-social environment.

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[15] Except to agree that war is legal -- an agreement which led to extensive treatment and codifications of the "laws of war."

Third, fear or uncertainty as to the overall effect of employing "unconventional" means.[16]

Fourth, the danger to the internal value system of the society. People who could not disentangle the rationales of the two separate standards -- the one social and legal, and the other extra-social and extra-legal -- might be either honestly confused or transformed into cynics. Others might understand why a dual standard exists but nonetheless question the appropriateness of departing from "legal" (internal) means. And even those sophisticated enough to understand and support the idea of a dual standard must recognize that a lack of self-restraint is a poor basis for settling lesser differences in the future. It seems likely that a democratic state could not for long maintain a Western value system with the single criterion that externally "good" ends justify unrestrained or unlimited means.

Finally, it must be recognized that means employed extra-socially have an unavoidable spill-over internally. For

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[16] For example, nuclear weapons are, in theory, simply larger in scale than conventional weapons. Yet the impact of their destructive power on human existence and on civilization is so uncertain, the moral implications so grave, the possibility that any isolated instance could be a Pandora's Box so serious that serious thought is just not given to their use short of a major threat to survival.

example, one cannot deceive an enemy without deceiving one's own citizens and the more active the propaganda directed at the enemy, the greater the effect at home as well. Efficiency in the field may involve suppression of dissent at home. And the necessity of preserving a democratic image in order to maintain the necessary public support could easily be seen as justification for tyrannizing those who seek to uncover the truth. A gulf could open between a society and its government, a gulf whose existence would represent great damage to the foundations of democratic government.

Thus, although it may be said that in extra-social situations "good" ends may justify whatever means are required, nonetheless various reasons usually operate to impose restraint.

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In reflecting on such matters as justice and injustice, right and wrong, good and evil, perfection and imperfection, or ends and means one is struck by the observation that if it were indeed possible to objectify these values and to set forth what they were once and for all there would be no need for what is thought of as either freedom or liberty. There would only be a need to state the values, establish a government, and charge it with the responsibility of efficiently pursuing the stated goals. Diversity and

pluralism would only complicate and delay fulfillment of the absolute values described. Tolerance would become an evil (isn't tolerance recognition that in a certain matter absolute truth is uncertain?). Mercy would have no virtue (isn't mercy self-doubt or a feeling that the person charged is not completely at fault?). The only criterion for such a government would be efficient pursuit of the stated values.

Thus it is the very fact that values, even the most important values, cannot be stated once and for all that has created the desirability of democratic government. For in the final analysis the virtue of democracy is the belief that a society must be its own judge of what its values are. Freedom and liberty as well as order are simply necessary to this end.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Democratic government may not be a viable form for all peoples, for every society, for each culture. Nor should it be the responsibility of any one nation to attempt to proselytize for it. Nevertheless, the idea of democratic government seems to have an elemental appeal, even for peoples and societies who have not known its blessings. For those who have, it should be their responsibility at least to describe their model accurately. This has not always been done in the past, with the result that unreasonable expectations often have been associated with democracy's more visible institutions -- e.g., universal suffrage, representative government, checks and balances, the party system, etc. Nor has it always been made clear that the more accurately a government reflects the moods and desires of its people, the more accurately it also will mirror the imperfections of society itself. A better understanding of the basis for democratic government should include a description of the relationship of the idea of democracy to man, to society, and to government. This paper discusses some implications of a theoretical model which focuses on these social aspects of democracy and discusses the model's normative implications.

I. PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW

This paper is concerned with the theoretical and structural bases for democracy. It assumes that order and freedom are critical components, that society must be treated as a concept distinct from government and from state and that practical norms can be established for democratic societies as well as for the overall democratic process.

In addition, this paper also reflects the belief that broad philosophical ideas can be practical devices for dealing with the difficult problems of organizing political structures, that democracy has philosophic truth in its favor and that, from a qualitative standpoint, democracy wherever found has certain basic features and common norms, though these features and norms do vary over a wide quantitative range.[1,2]

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[1] The basis for the first two beliefs will, in part, be argued in Chapter III. However, a completely separate theoretical basis for democratic government can be evolved on the basis of (1) its consistency with the concept of cybernetics and (2) evidence that cybernetics is in turn a field theory applicable to all man-designed, purposeful systems (as well as governing biological systems and their evolution). While this consideration is outside the scope of this paper, it is, nonetheless, relevant to the premise. See footnote 6, the Foreword.

[2] With respect to the third belief, the writer has in mind, inter alia, the provision for seeking out consensus even in tribal societies and in the city-states of the ancient world. See Frederick Watkins, The Political Tradition of the West (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 93-94. Also, Cf., Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), especially the note, "Problems in Comparing European and Asian Political Processes," pp. 159-161.

The particular aim of this paper is, with the use of a theoretical model, to discuss the above concerns, assumptions and beliefs as part of an integrated whole which grows out of man's pursuit of unity in diversity and his concurrent attempts to deal with an existence characterized in large part by ambiguity, ambivalence and imperfection. In so doing, the writer hopes to shed light on the reasons why the transplantation of democratic government often has proven so difficult -- in fact, so conspicuously unsuccessful -- whether sponsored by native or alien forces.

Democracy

Democracy is a term which cannot be used with precision. It has varying definitions and has been -- and is being -- used in pursuit of grossly differing purposes.[3] However, no definition or use of the term can escape the rather minimal implication that the word describes a government under the control of the people it governs.

These three common elements -- people, government and

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[3] Giovanni Sartori begins his book Democratic Theory (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965) with a quotation of George Orwell: "In the case of a word like democracy not only is there no agreed definition but the attempt to make one is resisted from all sides.... The defenders of any kind of regime claim that it is a democracy, and fear that they might have to stop using the word if it were tied down to any one meaning." ("Politics and the English Language," in Selected Essays, Baltimore, 1957, p. 149)

degree of control -- are what one is talking about whether it is democracy at the international level,[4] at the national level or at some lower or local level. In short, this political form necessarily involves the relationship of people on the one hand to their government on the other. Thus, while states may pretend to have personalities, emotions, the right to exist -- indeed, to possess a full range of human attributes -- such pretensions are not themselves central to the question of whether or not there can be a basis for the formation of a democratic international community or a basis for the creation of democracy at the international level. Rather, the central question is whether a structure at the international level can show itself responsive to the needs of a society which controls it, and whether it can take account of the social laws which affect society. If this is a practical question it is also theoretical.

Ambiguity

If democracy is first of all a theoretical concept, its foundations at the international level might be assumed to be the same

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[4] The question of whether there is, is not or can be democracy at the international level is purposely left until after the theoretical discussion in Chapter VI. However, it is obvious that an interstate relationship is by definition extra-democratic since it involves states rather than people as actors.

as for democracy at other levels and these foundations should reflect whatever truths govern the social conduct of man. Man's social conduct does seem to reflect the fact that existence is by nature ambiguous and an understanding of existence would seem to require that the particular ambiguities facing man in society be taken into account. Even that in life which is held to be "good" is constrained by this interpretation, and this fact has led Paul Tillich to refer to what he calls "the American irony" as "the ambiguity of perfection."[5] The general framework for the attempt in this paper to deal with man's political confusion over the fact of ambiguity is stated in terms of the idea of unity in diversity.

Unity in Diversity

The concept of unity in diversity characterizes the human struggle as one aimed at reconciling problems of "the one and the many," problems whose effects often appear to be mutually exclusive.[6] Thus, man may conceive of the need for unity and

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[5] Paul Tillich, "The Ambiguity of Perfection," Time (17 May 1963), p. 69.

[6] Unity in diversity can be a description of the political process in a democratic state as well as a dichotomy for characterizing the more fundamental impulses of man in society. For example, the Jeffersonian description of electioneering in the United States in his first innaugural address has been so characterized in William Y. Elliott and Neil A. MacDonald, Western Political Heritage (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1949), pp. 897-900.

the need for diversity in one or another of its manifestations, such as order and freedom. But in pursuing the both he finds that fulfillment of the one subtracts from realization of the other. As the contest in political matters between order and freedom suggests, it is not easy to attain a satisfactory balance of the two. And, in frustration or because of an imbalance in their value systems, some men have been led to deny the validity, as a goal, of either unity or diversity in order to focus single-mindedly on the pursuit of the one not rejected. Specifically, this may be a case of rejecting freedom in favor of order, or it may be the reverse.

There is, then, a certain irony in these efforts whose consequences appear to produce undesirable as well as desirable effects; and it is indeed strange that if both unity and diversity are considered to be "good," the maximization of the one should serve to minimize the other. No wonder it is said -- politically as well as materially -- that man cannot have his cake and eat it too.

Yet while it certainly appears that the consequences of man's efforts are ironic, and that a synthesis of unity and diversity is illusory, it is possible that the foregoing is a highly inaccurate perception of the true relationship of unity to diversity or, more at point, of order to freedom. Indeed, it can be seen that a rather

satisfactory realization of both order and freedom has existed in some political communities from time to time; and, in a rough manner, this can be said to describe the recent experience of most of the states of the democratic West, which have known over extended periods relative internal stability and peaceful political change within the confines of their respective domestic jurisdictions. Who can deny, for example, that this has been true, in the main, in the United States, in Canada and in Great Britain; or, to a lesser extent, in France and other states of Western Europe? Moreover, most men who are familiar with the traditions of the great Western states think of democracy as the only tolerable method of government.

As it is known in the West, the practice of democracy includes a number of rather mechanistic concepts such as representative government, majority rule, checks and balances, universal suffrage, etc. Also, it is said to mean freedom; it is said to be a way of life; and it is said to be concerned with the individual and his personal liberties.

But when emotion is removed from the above words, they offer very little practical and concrete assistance for those who would seek to transplant democracy to alien soil. And, applied at the international level, democratic methods have proved a

certain prescription for conflict, disunity and structural irrelevance.[7]

Thus, with few exceptions, democracy has not flourished other than where it has evolved as a part of a nation's overall heritage.[8] Even in the West, democracy's record is uneven and blemished; in the non-West -- Japan excepted -- most efforts to transplant a "hot house" brand of democracy have failed catastrophically.

The reasons for democracy's apparent failure constitute no enigma. As a matter of fact, a great many specific and valid criticisms generally are presented in each case where democratic government has been tried and has failed to take root. But because it is obviously hypersensitive to culture, environment, an efficient enemy and a nation's past experience is no reason to conclude that democracy has nothing to offer the disadvantaged, the underdeveloped and those nations whose total experience has been to

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[7] If the League of Nations and the United Nationa Organization can be regarded as attempts to apply domestic democratic techniques at the international level, it can be argued that they are examples of conspicuous failure.

[8] This is not to deny Kennan's observation that "...the creation of higher political forms has normally been a process of erosion from despotism..." George F. Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), p. 37.

know intimately the infinite forms of tyranny, despotism and anarchy.

The fact is that democratic government is a blessing only for a democratic society. And what constitutes a democratic society is a matter so little understood in newly-emergent nations that this fact alone could account for most failures at democratic nation-building. Such a society cannot be assumed into existence and then crowned with a constitution made elsewhere. Neither can one build a democratic society simply by recognizing that this is the key problem and getting a loan from an international agency or a rich and friendly nation. A democratic society need not be a westernized society. On the contrary, indigenous cultural values can be a factor of strength. However, the society must reconcile its impulses to unity and to diversity. If it can accomplish this, it is getting close to the deeper meaning of democracy.

Of course, there can be no effective long range plan for building a society, democratic or otherwise. The task is far too complex, as the efforts to restructure Soviet society seem to confirm.[9] However, it is fair to say that every society has

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[9] This has reference to the fact that when the Bolsheviks destroyed so many of the institutions of Russian society, the government and party were left with the impossible task of replacing them. The impossibility of consciously rebuilding the society except over a period of many years, it can be argued, made police rule inevitable.

more to build on than can easily be seen. And given an understanding of the theoretical nature of democracy, the first step, at least, can be taken; surely, thousands more must follow -- and with the certain knowledge that the charted course will often change under the weight of accumulated experience.

It appears, then, that the previous reference to having and eating cake is not an apt analogy. Heaven on earth is surely beyond man's reach; but unity in diversity -- to a degree -- is possible. If it is possible in a degree adequate to relieve some of the grosser effects of a unity that is divisive or a diversity that is anarchic then it is a worthwhile substitute for any more utopian and ultimate goal. But practical success requires a sound theoretical foundation. Thus, a theoretical examination of democracy whether at the national level or at the international level requires the comprehensive argument which follows. It is not an optimistic argument and is surely not deterministic. It is, however, a means of gauging the gap between aspiration and achievement, between theory and reality.

II. UNITY IN DIVERSITY AS AN ORGANIZING CONCEPT

The first observation that will be made is in the nature of a premise: that it is the never ending purpose of men in society -- as seen explicitly in their statements of the idea itself,

implicitly in their statements of goals and values, and elsewhere in the observable consequences of their conduct -- to seek a condition of unity in diversity and to maintain such an equilibrium.

A second premise flows from the foregoing: that because this basic idea, this philosophical concept of unity in diversity, is both universal and timeless, it is strikingly suited to form the foundation of a general theory of politics and society.

Finally, unity in diversity is -- in addition to nature's great example of a pluriverse within a universe -- construed to be a social phenomenon. It is a product of society and, in effect, an expression of the completeness or incompleteness of social integration. To the extent that people or groups of people remain unrelated socially -- that is, so long as extra-social conditions exist -- unity in diversity is beyond attainment. Thus a social relationship can be said to be a precondition to the attainment of unity in diversity in the political realm.

The first premise, while presumably subject to empirical proof, does not appear to warrant a searching enquiry in this endeavor. It is hoped that it is sufficiently non-controversial to allow the argument to proceed.[10] The validity of the second

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[10] It is recognized that the term "unity in diversity" is not a common way of describing human purpose. What is contended is that (1) human purpose can be inferred from human actions and statements, and, (2) that unity in diversity is a term descriptive of this conduct. This is obviously an existenialist interpretation of existence since it focuses on the apparent contradictions and the ambiguity and ambivalence which are recurring themes throughout human history.

premise will be argued in the pages to follow. The final premise is also argumentative.

Whether or not the idea of unity in diversity is the ultimate, God-given purpose of human existence will not be argued, for such knowledge is irrelevant to politics. Politics, in the broad sense, is the business of finding answers to the problems raised by the fact that man lives in relation to other men, in society so to speak. Thus it is the consequences of human thoughts and actions that have concerned man and as long as this remains the case there always will be time enough to consider the question of ultimate purpose.

This is not to say that the meaning of human existence in a causal or ultimate sense should not be pursued; it should be; and, like the mystery of human nature, it will be studied by those who find such pursuits valuable for their own reasons. But such contemplations of ultimate causes are not necessary to consideration of the political problems of man. For by the consequences of his day to day thoughts and actions he already has generated and is continuing to generate a political purpose independent of any ultimate purpose -- if indeed ultimate purpose does differ from political purpose.

It will be maintained then that the consequence-revealed purpose of human existence is the pursuit of unity in diversity in a form which can be described as the phenomenon of community. This pursuit is concerned specifically with order and freedom. And its goal is to effect that "harmony of the whole which does not destroy the vitality of its parts."[11] The thoughts that follow are an effort to integrate this universal and timeless purpose into a meaningful theoretical framework.

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[11] A phrase of George Santayana which Reinhold Niebuhr has used to define "the good." Quoted in Stanley Hoffmann, Contemporary Theory in International Relations, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 23.

CHAPTER II

THE BELL CURVE HYPOTHESIS

Introduction

Having said that human purpose is the pursuit of unity in diversity and that this finds its expression in organized society in the pursuit of order in freedom through institutions of community, it remains to translate what is a vague abstraction into a tighter and more meaningful framework. This leads to a final contention: that graphically unity in diversity may be depicted by the so-called probability or bell curve (which is also known as a curve of standard distribution and as a Gaussian curve).

There are subjective reasons to support this contention but, like many other ideas, the origin of the stimulus giving rise to it is, in the end, unimportant. The validity of the contention will be demonstrated by its speculative value.

The bell curve model, as described in this chapter is an imperfect form containing several ambiguities and logical inconsistencies. However, by sticking to it as a graphical representation of unity in diversity (order in freedom), the writer is forced to re-define the variables in order to maintain the fiction of the premise. Implication follows implication, new definitions

are required and eventually a new model emerges (Chapter IV) much more consistent with the varying social and political forms of man, in and out of society. In this chapter only the original crude model will be described. But contemplation of it will help in understanding the evolution of the theory.

The Bell Curve

The probability, or bell, curve has a maximum ordinate of unity at its center; its ordinates approach zero assymtotically as the abscissae reach plus and minus infinity. (See Figure 1.) If the curve is taken as representative of a political community or of a society it might be said that the right hand portion represents the forces in that community or society of unity while the left hand portion represents the forces of diversity. Further it might be argued that the intensity of the forces of unity or of diversity are a function of their distance from the vertical axis. (See Figure 2.) And if it is hypothesized that within political communities the manifestations of unity and diversity are order and freedom, then these values may be substituted in the graph for unity and diversity respectively. (See Figure 3.)

At this point is it evident that several difficulties have arisen. First, if there is such a thing as intensity of the forces of order and freedom then how can it be measured? And in what



Figure 1.



Figure 2.



Figure 3.

units? Second, what are "forces" of order and freedom? Are these merely nebulous conceptions, the products of abstract speculations? If they cannot be objectified and, at least in theory, quantified then there is no practical value to the model. Third, it has been hypothesized that the curve itself represents a political community. But is that logically consistent? Is a political community solely the product of forces of order and freedom?[1] If indeed these are the dynamic forces of a community of people what happens in the event that an actual government is not representative of these forces and is maintained by forces outside of the political community itself?[2] Fourth, there is the question of the bell curve. Are all political communities to be represented thusly? Or is the bell curve merely a norm to which

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[1] Cf. Richard W. Van Wagenen, Research in the International Organization Field (Princeton: Center for Research on World Political Institutions, Princeton University, 1952), Chapter I and II for a discussion of sense of community, integration, and security community; also, Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1954), Chapters 2-4, which discuss the meanings and kinds of community, the activities and relationships which constitute a community, and how communities originate and evolve.

[2] For example, a colonial government or a traditional autocracy where the ruling elite constitute only a tiny percentage of the numbers of a society.

the actual condition can be compared? Fifth, what is the significance of the fact that different communities might be represented by different shaped curves? And finally, order and freedom, or unity and diversity, are depicted as being antithetical. Does this mean that one must cancel out the other?

At first glance the foregoing questions seem to challenge any utility the model might be thought to possess. In fact, however, they merely indicate the directions in which additional reflection is needed. All of the questions will be answered in the following chapters but it might be useful at this point to indicate the general nature of the answers.

Intensity of order and freedom.[3] The unit through which forces of order and freedom are expressed is the individual; and the individual is the basic unit of the political community. Therefore, the intensity with which the forces of order and freedom are manifested within a political community can be said to be directly related to the number, or percentage, of individuals within

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[3] Intensity of order and freedom is concerned with quantifying these two concepts. It should not be confused with the problem of intensity of preference with respect to an interest as discussed by Dahl. Cf. Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 48 ff and p. 90 ff. Intensity of preference is certainly a factor in assaying the effect of various interests on social (and hence, political) stability. See footnote 13, Chapter III, and footnote 5, Chapter V.

that community who are so affected. In other words, one dimension of order and freedom is public consensus.

Identifying order and freedom. Obviously, the idea of a lump force of order or of freedom is an unmanageable analytical quantity. Besides, while people talk about order and freedom, they act and respond in terms of more empirically identifiable stimuli which might be thought of as separate and distinct "interests." It is these interests which reflect the unseen forces of order and freedom and are their visible manifestation. This means that if the diverse interests of the political community can be identified, classified as order-dominant or freedom-dominant in nature, then the percentage consensus can be measured for each interest. The number of interests is the second dimension of order and freedom.

Political community vs. sense of community. It now seems evident that what is described by a plot of consensus versus interests is not at all an institutionalized political community. Instead, it adds up merely to a sense of community. The actual institutions of a political community may or may not take into account the public consensus. For the time being, then, order and freedom-dominant interests will be discussed with regard to their relationship to sense of community; the relationship of sense

of community to political community will be taken up in a later chapter.

The bell curve norm. Another observation which flows from this discussion is the extreme unlikelihood that any political community's sense of community will do more than approach the shape of a bell curve. The bell curve will simply serve as a postulated norm against which actual sense of community can be compared. Its advantages for this purpose will be discussed in Chapter IV along with the significance to be attached to the varying shapes of actual curves of sense of community.

Order and freedom. It might be argued that neither unity and diversity nor order and freedom are antithetical to one another, that in fact they bear some other relationship such as that of perpendicular forces. However, there appears to be little or no evidence to support such a contention. The traditional relationship is accepted herein and in support thereof it will merely be observed that in the physical world electrons and protons carry opposite charges but are not opposites in other respects -- for example, they both have mass. Moreover, electrons and protons may combine to form neutrons, uncharged particles that nevertheless possess a mass equal to the combined mass of the electrons and portons from which they were formed.

If the above is an apt analogy it would seem to suggest that even though order and freedom are antithetical in nature, they do not necessarily cancel each other out of existence. In fact, since it is contended that order and freedom are manifested through interests that well may be concrete, it is likely that both order and freedom coexist because the interests to which they are attached are not in themselves antithetical. As an example, a freedom-dominant interest might be that of securing and safeguarding civil liberties while an order-dominant interest might involve regulating interstate commerce. Though the two examples reflect fundamentally opposite forces of diversity and unity, or freedom and order, it is readily conceivable that the same individual could hold to both interests without feeling any internal contradiction.[4]

This conclusion has, therefore, significant theoretical implications, for it suggests that unity and diversity are mere classifications accorded to numerous stimuli. Unless the stimuli, or interests, are of themselves opposite in nature, the

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[4] Cf. Frederick Watkins, The Political Tradition of the West (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 98f. In discussing Rousseau's development of the general will, Watkins notes Rousseau's contention that man can desire at the same time "two mutually incompatible ends."

individual may pursue some of each more or less simultaneously. His self then becomes the unifying framework for the pursuit of diverse, oppositely classified interests. And while the ideas of unity and diversity may represent contradictory pulls within the individual's value structure, because values are a product of environment and environment is constantly changing, a spatial separation develops between interests: never can a person react exactly the same to a given stimulus recurring at a different point in time.

The question of priority. There still remains another aspect of unity in diversity which in the order-freedom manifestation is relevant to the bell curve theory. Is unity or diversity the prior condition?

It has been argued both ways. For example, is it government that makes possible the development of society? Or is it the other way? Aristotle took the position that "the whole is necessarily prior to the part," a position supported by Karl Deutsch in his Political Community at the International Level.[5] But the opposite seems to be just as true and John Dewey, among others, has argued that the raison d'etre of governments

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[5] Deutsch, op. cit., p. 6.

develops as a result of social development, i.e. -- from the broader consequences of interests privately pursued.[6]

It is true, of course, that all of being is unified in the ultimate simplicity of the term universe. At the same time, it is equally true that man lives existentially in a pluriverse. Man is certainly not unaware that he is within a universe, and the ceaseless efforts of some to give purpose to human existence is indicative of a belief that humanity is somewhere unified by a purpose that escapes unanimous perception. But day by day man pursues his interests in infinite variety, number, and complexity with not much more than passing thought to his reference framework, the whole of which he is but a part.

In a like manner, life within a political community takes note of the fact of that community's existence only when the community threatens man or is itself threatened by other forces. For the most part, private energies, even though in some cases state directed, do not impinge on the fact of the state's existence.

And so it is with the individual; his unitary existence is a fact necessary to his infinite expressions of individuality. Yet

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[6] John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Denver: Allan Swallow, 1954) (Original edition by Henry Holt & Co., 1927), pp. 12-22. Both views are inconclusive on this point, however, since both seem to presuppose the existence of at least an inchoate society.

it is only when this existence is threatened that he pauses in his existential pursuits and takes account of the other half of reality, of truth.[7]

It would seem then that the unifying shell or framework of the universe, of the state, of society or of the individual is at least a necessary condition to their pluralistic functioning. This does not mean, however, that they are prior conditions. For what is a universe that is not also a pluriverse? What is a state that does not have administrative and operational functions? What is a society without social intercourse? What is an individual without his individuality? A structure must be supported by parts and the idea of a structure without parts is impossible to conceive. Such things are purely imaginary, like the existence of a point.

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[7] "Raymond Aron begins his monumental work Peace and War with the words, 'troubled times encourage meditation.' ... Turbulent eras have been rich in philosophical enquiry. Aron, like Toynbee, Morgenthau, and Niebuhr in earlier writings, reminds us that Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Politics coincided with the crises of the Greek city-state. Hobbes Leviathan and Spinoza's Tractatus were produced during the religious wars that 'lacerated' Europe in the seventeenth century. Locke wrote during the century of the English Revolution. Montesquieu and Rousseau developed their concepts of representative and democratic governments as the French prepared to exchange traditional monarchy for a revolutionary regime..." Kenneth W. Thompson, "Theory and International Studies in the Cold War" in Abdul A. Said (Editor), Theory of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 20.

What is possible to conceive is a framework with a minimum number of parts. And if this minimum number escapes perception it may appear that the whole can be prior. At the same time such a whole is bound to be less than it appears, as witness, in the political world, by "perfect" constitutions which have little effect.

Man in society is concerned with order and freedom and it has been his unfortunate lot that a stable equilibrium of the two has never continued for long. And in situations of instability, because it may appear that order must be prior to freedom, it often has been exalted as the sine qua non of civilization.[8] The reverse has been argued too, and a surprising amount of Jacobin optimism still exists in liberal Western politics and in their bodies politic.[9]

But one must be cautious in translating a form of philosophical

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[8] The primacy of order is an argument put forth by most autocratic regimes. For example, the military takeover of the Brazilian government in 1964, as well as those which subsequently took place in Peru, Argentina, Panama, and the Dominican Republic; it has been the basis in South Vietnam for the exclusion of many non-Viet Cong critics from participation in government.

[9] It was this sort of optimism which brought pressure on the U. S. government to withdraw support from the Diem regime in 1963; in the late 1960's in the United States, it was in part an optimistic belief in the primacy of freedom that led to rejection of institutions of order by certain student groups.

truth into the political idiom. If order and freedom are inter-dependent it does not necessarily follow that all operative expressions of order and freedom within a political community are recognizable or detectable. In other words, the consequences of order-dominant and freedom-dominant interests may be felt without recognition of the interests themselves. For example, insistence on order as a prior condition to freedom may succeed without it becoming apparent that freedom in a sense meaningful to the members of that community is in fact existent. In this case, the great danger would seem to be in pursuing order to the point where existing freedoms are erased in the process. Of course, the example might be turned around, as essentially happened in the French and Bolshevik Revolutions.

In sum, priority between order and freedom -- as between unity and diversity -- does not exist. But in the world of politics an experienced and sensitive perception is needed in order to pierce the veil of illusion and detect those expressions whose effects may be felt without being seen, thus giving the appearance that order or freedom -- usually order -- is indeed a prerequisite.[10]

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[10] For example, the customs and traditions of many European states provide a considerable basis for self-imposed order even in the absence of government institutions -- a fact which accounts in part for the rapid economic recovery of Europe following World War II. Likewise, the instinct for order inherent in Jewish society has been a major factor in the rapid integration of Jews from all over the world into the modern state of Israel.

Interests

The analytical unit of human nature used herein is embraced in the term interests. It is a term descriptive of the consequences of human nature. It is broadly conceived so as to include any humanly felt or expressed need, thought, value, or action whether it be rational or irrational, spontaneous or deliberate, material of spiritual. An interest may be as simple as what one thinks his interest is irrespective of whether its pursuit may be objectively harmful to the pursuer or conducive to his welfare. Or interests may be revealed through the consequences of day-to-day actions. The term, in brief, is intended to be as broad as is necessary to reflect a human nature that is thought to be infinitely complex.

The term does not imply what man's interests should be. Rather it identifies the consequences of human nature as the material which, when unordered, may lead to conflict and when harmonized may lead to value satisfaction. Hence the desirability that they should be expressed within a framework of order.

Interest identification is obviously an inexact process and one which can only be partially successful at best. But assuming that the more important an interest is to an individual the more effort he will make to communicate it, there is reason to suppose that a considerable knowledge about human interests is available

to those who seek them out. Thus, schematically, man's nature is looked on as a "black box" into which a stimulus is fed and out of which comes an interest. While judgments as to his "true" nature, value preferences, and capacity to reason may indeed be based on the interests he reveals, it would be a gross mistake to conclude that the judgments are more than oversimplifications of an infinitely complex cause-effect process which at best can be understood only partially.[11]

Interests are then the manifestations of man's individuality. Also, they account for -- but do not describe -- the process by which man has transformed himself from an individual to a social unit. This process is the crux of the community formation phenomenon which is herein thought of as the consequence-revealed purpose of human existence.

Democracy

In the realm of domestic politics democracy is a term made meaningful by its association with mechanistic concepts -- unrestricted adult suffrage, majority rule, representative government, two political parties, church-state separation, checks and balances, etc. These concepts have their place in a society which considers

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[11] See the discussion of "human nature" in the preface.

itself sovereign and is ever seeking to find effective methods of expressing its "general will." However, they tend to obscure the truth that democracy is only effective insofar as a general will, in the sense that Rousseau intended, exists to be expressed. In its absence, so-called democratic institutions simply register particular wills, or at best a "will of all," which is their summation.[12] To nurture, communicate, and express a general will is the meaning of democracy, as herein employed.

In practice then, it follows that democracy is a goal never to be completely, or even closely realized. It is nonetheless, hopefully, what Stanley Hoffmann would regard as a "relevant utopia"[13] -- it may be enough if the actual results of majority rule keep individual frustration and dissatisfaction at low enough levels so that the organization of society is not itself threatened.

Thus, the deeper meaning of democracy is that it is an expression of the degree of the social relationship between the individual and the community of which he is a part -- in other words an expression of the degree of social integration present.

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[12] Cf. the discussion, "The Problem of the General Will" in Watkins, op. cit., pp. 90-118.

[13] Stanley Hoffmann, Contemporary Theory in International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960), pp. 184-190.

If there is social integration, or to the degree that it exists, the community possesses the potential for a political democracy which can relate the individual to government in terms of his interests, thereby establishing the basis for organic action by society (as opposed to action through an individual, or individuals, who might merely control or manipulate society.)[14]

Although the writer employs Rousseau's idea of a general will, together with his distinction between society and government, the basis of the general will is different. It is still the general will of society, or of the community, and not some Hegelian manifestation of national interest. However, rather than being founded on the basis of a supposed natural virtue or of the goodness in mankind and being threatened by particular wills, it is thought of as synonymous with John Dewey's concept of the public interest[15] -- an interest that arises as the consequences of interests privately pursued extend beyond the group immediately engaged. Thus, the greater the number of private interests, the more likely the generation of a public interest (as a result of

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[14] Relating the individual to government has little intrinsic value if there is little social development. In such cases, the more representative a government, the more likely it will be arbitrary and unstable precisely because the society itself is unstable.

[15] Dewey, loc. cit.

conflicting interests);the greater the extent of a private interest, the more likely its consequences will affect others and thereby generate a public interest. A multiplicity of private interests tends to link the individuals of a society together by unseen bonds that account for the numerous sub-societies or smaller communities operating within the more extensive one. Dewey's requirement for "face-to-face communication" is the absolute essential for creating a community-wide awareness of the private interests of all its members and thus the ability to perceive, understand, and accept the public interest. Like democracy itself, the goal of total communication is merely a relevant utopia; it is enough if the degree of non-communication is not so large as to incapacitate government, or, in the extreme, to destroy its necessary social base. [16]

In summary, democracy has five essentials:

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[16] Again, note the contrast with Rousseau: Because particular wills threatened the general will and "the general will was always right" -- and therefore "good" -- larger communities represented an inherent threat to the general will because they had more particular wills. The relationship herein discussed ascribes no independent virtue to the general will (public interests); rather its value is related to its function in harmonizing private interests -- i.e., particular wills. More private interests may make the task of legislation and government more complex but at the same time they make life more meaningful. Watkins, loc. cit.

First, a group of individuals linked together by a multiplicity of private interests.

Second, an awareness on the part of the group members of each other's interests and their extent;[17]

Third, the ability of the group members to see themselves as constituting a larger community, a society having a public interest generated as the consequence of pursuing private interests;

Fourth, the political institutions for expressing the general will, or public interest, in a manner appropriate to practical requirements; and

Fifth, a "feedback" system for stimulating the pursuit of private interests, thereby keeping the entire process vital.

That order and freedom are deeply entwined in the pursuit of interests is a part of democracy's definition that will emerge in Chapter III with discussion of the role of interests in society.

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[17] Obviously such perceptions are always imperfect. Nonetheless, they are of crucial importance to democratic government since without such knowledge there is no basis for evaluating one's own narrow interests as opposed to those of the community.

CHAPTER III

THE ROLE OF INTERESTS IN SOCIETY

I. INTRODUCTION

Essentially the community theory argument is a simple one. Stimuli, whether external to man or within him, are treated by a unique human nature to produce an individual's interests. At any one instant these interests have a hierarchical relationship to one another. The interests in turn are compared with those of others and it is discovered that some are common, some conflicting while some appear to be neither. In pursuing common interests jointly it then becomes apparent that broader capabilities are created for the individual, thus furnishing a rationale for maintaining a common, or social, arrangement. This rationale, which is termed sense of community[1], is why conflicting individual interests are often deferred to broader social considerations.

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[1] The term "sense of community" is taken from Richard W. Van Wagenen, Research in the International Organization Field: Some Notes on a Possible Focus (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University, 1952), p. 11. As used by Van Wagenen, the term is defined as "...a feeling on the part of an individual or individuals inhabiting a given territory that consensus has been attained to the effect that common social problems must and can be resolved or adjusted by processes of peaceful change."

When sense of community is strong enough to achieve this deference to public or community interest and when institutions, formal or informal, are devised to aid in the process it is further said that a community exists.[2] Finally, if the community becomes so extensive as to be an all-inclusive society and if it adopts institutions which allow it to express itself both externally and internally, it is a political community.

Stated in another way the argument is more explicit. As an individual, man's interests may be classified in two categories: survival-dominant interests which reflect the desire to maintain life itself (his); and satisfaction-dominant interests which reflect a broader concern. Thus, what common interest pursuit does is to share the burden of some of the more onerous and demanding requirements for insuring survival and elemental satisfaction, thereby increasing an individual's interest capability. Other survival-dominant and satisfaction-dominant interests remain outside the framework of common effort but those that are so joined are termed public interests and become a new dichotomy:

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[2] See footnote 2, Chapter II. When Rousseau distinguished between the general will and the will of all he thought of the two as "mutually incompatible ends." Deference to the public interest is, then, similar to operation of the general will.

order-dominant interests which reflect a concern for the preservation of the joint effort; and freedom-dominant interests which reflect a concern of the individual to maintain his individuality. This new dichotomy of order-dominant and freedom-dominant interests characterizes what is termed civil-society; the former dichotomy in which interests are merely survival-dominant or satisfaction dominant concerns individual interests and is the hypothetical state of nature. Public interests, then, can be thought of as interests derived as a consequence of pursuing individual interests within a common, or social, framework, or, in other words, within a community.[3] Thus public interests and common interests are directly related in an ideal community; and with ideal communications a general, or common, will can be assumed to emerge;[4] common interests are then viewed in the

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[3] As described by John Dewey. See John Dewey, The Public and its Problems (Denver: Allan Swallow) (Original edition by Henry Holt & Co., 1927), pp. 12-22.

[4] The validity of both Rousseau's and Aristotle's emphasis on communities limited in size is supported by the above argument when one takes into account the limited efficiency of communications which they foresaw. Thus, a general will was conceived to be a local phenomenon by Rousseau, and Aristotle thought of his ideal state as having a population somewhere between 10,000 and 100,000. See Jean Jacques Rousseau, "The Social Contract" in William Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers (N. Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961) p. 457; and Karl W. Keutsch, Political Community at the International Level (N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1954 p. 5. Also, see footnote 10, Chapter II.

context of the overall sense of community. Actually, of course, all of man's interests are not so viewed: the state of civil-society is everywhere incomplete and even if it were not, the ability to communicate individual interests and so to find common interests is imperfectly developed.

The foregoing hypothetical sketch illustrates the essential community formation phenomenon. Two final considerations, however, indicate the extent to which the phenomenon, although essentially a natural one, is non-deterministic. First, simultaneously with the development of a political community other communities are developing with which it is not in communication. Thus each such isolated community is not unlike the hypothetical man in the state of nature: it -- the community, not its people -- develops survival-dominant and satisfaction-dominant interests which pertain to the community as a personality rather than as a group expression of individuals. Thus it is a paradox that the unifying process of community development is also intrinsically divisive, for the interests and institutions which bind one community together are as likely to separate it from other communities. Only by developing inter-community communications and common interests between the people of the various communities can a more inclusive sense of community be developed.

The second consideration is the element of reality that has hitherto been missing in the argument: some political entities, or nation-states as they now are called, are not the end result of a community-formation process. Instead they are simply large groups of people over whom a government has been instituted that bears no direct institutional relationship to them. Nor, in such cases, is there a single common society developed to the point where it could express a general will. India appears to be a multi-society state, for example, and many of the new African states find society only at the tribal level.[5]

The argument will now be examined in detail.

II. INTERESTS, SENSE OF COMMUNITY, AND COMMUNITY

Man's interests do not exist independently of his existence, although there are objective forces which act on him, which

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[5] While every large society is composed of numerous groups which loosely can be referred to as communities -- i.e., the religious, professional, business, ethnic groups -- the developed or integrated society has a larger frame of interests in sufficient number and of such quality as to substantially diminish what would otherwise be the divisive effects of the smaller groups. For example, the United States is obviously highly integrated even though it has several minority groups which are not; the Congo (K), on the other hand, does not have a matrix of interests capable of overriding the more meaningful interests of tribe and geographic region.

stimulate and help to shape his value system, his reason, his nature, and which therefore are responsible in part for his interests. These might be the result of other men's actions or they might be the product of nature. In any event, they constitute what is called the human environment. Perhaps, too, subjective stimulants whose effects are felt but whose existence can only be conjectured also exist. A historical force or a universal will are possible examples. Additionally, man has the capacity for auto-stimulation.

But irrespective of the sources of the various stimuli, interests themselves can be created only through an interaction of stimuli and that mysterious unknown quantity which is human nature and which is apparently unique to each individual. Interests, therefore, are inherently personal however similar they may appear to be. The exact character of an individual's self may provoke inspired theories -- such as those of Freud -- but in the end the search cannot lead to definitive findings. Thus, human nature cannot be precisely explained because neither the stimuli can be effectively isolated nor can the interests be accurately identified.

Because interests are personal creations, the idea of objective interests is a correct concept only if it is understood as

being in the realm of "oughts." To say that so-called objective interests are other than "oughts" is to deny to man a category of real interests as human as the capacity to err: to wit, his irrational interests. His welfare may be endangered by his ignoring of what someone else might choose to call objective interests but this is a course everyone chooses at one time or another. For example, public interests -- which will be discussed at a later point -- may be regarded as in every citizen's individual interest yet many individuals dissent in specific instances.

It is implicit in the foregoing that an interest, besides being uniquely personal, must be perceived by the owner in order to exist; if it is beyond the threshold of perceptibility it does not exist. For example, values which an individual claims are in the realm of interests; values which he does not claim but which nevertheless are evidenced by his conduct are assumed to be a part of his nature -- his internal value structure. Hence they are not interests. Since the human environment is obviously a source of constant stimulation, it is assumed that in addition to helping to create individual interests it is also constantly causing an individual's nature to change.

Because they are perceptible, an individual may classify

and characterize his interests; he may also weigh them to determine their instantaneous importance to him. Thus although the manner in which they develop in his mind and find conscious expression is an inexplicable process, the consequences of the process are evident to the individual. Moreover, some of an individual's interests are evident to others and accordingly take on the character of stimuli so far as others are concerned. In other words, as individual interests multiply they also, in varying degrees, overlap, interact, and become interdependent the one on the other. This is a development which engages the attention of all men.

Some of the more obvious interests of others are evident in their actions and conduct; still more about their interests is revealed through more personal methods of communication -- such as conversation and discourse. As a result, individuals can detect many situations in which it may occur to them that their interests are in harmony with those of others. If this leads to a feeling that joint pursuit of such interests is of greater mutual benefit than the sacrifices it entails, then a sense of community is said to exist. Thus common interests are the visible manifestations of sense of community.

Pursuit of individual interests within a community, whether

conducted singly or jointly, is bound to bring about conflicts of interests too. This occurs when the consequences of such pursuits extend beyond the group immediately concerned, an occurence which generates a public interest directed towards the amelioration of the effects of uncontrolled pursuit. Public interests are the true test of sense of community; for although sense of community is created by recognition of common interests, it is maintained by deferring conflicting common interests to public interests. This act of recognizing the value of sense of community by deferring to public interests is the act which transforms a group having a sense of community into a community. And just as common interests are the visible manifestations of sense of community, so the institutions, formal or informal, for detecting the public interest and ensuring its effective execution are the visible manifestations of community. It might be noted that if there were no conflicting interests and no threats from outside the community, there would be no need for community institutions: sense of community would be a sufficient framework for the pursuit of individual and common interests.[6]

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[6]Not that this would be an ideal community. Community institutions, such as schools and public services, actually play a vital role in the integrative process apart from reconciling conflicting interests or organizing community security. See Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integrative Process" in Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (editors), The Integration of Political Communities (New York: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1964), pp. 1-45.

III. INTEREST CLASSIFICATION

The foregoing argument also can be made by another approach which involves the classification of interests. For argumentative purposes, it is assumed that a state of nature existed prior to that of civil society -- although it seems probable, as Rousseau argued, that such a state never did in reality exist. It is enough, however, to think of it as the point or origin from which social man has traced his steps to the present. Whether or not it actually existed is irrelevant. The point is that neither does the state of civil society exist, except as a goal towards which man is directing himself. Thus, if civil society is incompletely realized, man must be somewhere between the state of nature and his social goal. Also, those characteristics of man in the state of nature which might be logically inferred are still operative, along with those which pertain to the state of civil society.

In theory, civil society implies a single society embracing all of mankind; until this is a reality man must recognize that the respective members of different societies are extra-social with respect to one another -- which is another way of

saying in the state of nature.[7] Therefore, civil society and the state of nature are the two limiting forms which mark, respectively, the outer limits of complete community integration and of the completely individual human.

Superfically, it appears that it is not man who is incompletely integrated but the several communities into which he is divided. However, a moment's reflection is remindful of the fact that communities do not have the ability to feel emotion, to trust, to recognize common or public interests. Men do these things and the fact that sometimes their actions are official, sometimes private cannot change the personal nature of their origin. Man is a social creature; but also he is often on his own. Any thorough understanding of the foundations of society must take into consideration the incompleteness which is characteristic of any civil society.

To take into account man's conduct as a non-social unit, his interests are divided into two classifications: his survival-

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[7] In essence only, of course, since actually there is a web of interests that binds various people of different countries together in varying degrees. However, it is far more valid to think of, for example, American society and Iranian society as extra-social with respect to each other than as part of a larger society. With respect to other societies the same would be true although the degree of extra-sociality would differ. The United States and Great Britain, for example.

dominant interests, which reflect his unilateral battle merely to stay alive; and his satisfaction-dominant interests, which reflect his individual need to find purpose in existence -- whether it be to satisfy appetite or taste, to find beauty or aesthetic enjoyment, or to know spiritual contentment. Irrationality for such an isolated man would consist of deferring to a satisfaction-dominant interest in the face of a threat to his survival.

It seems reasonable, however, to suppose that man has transferred to civil societies -- to the extent that they exist -- much of his concern for sheer survival and a considerable responsibility for providing satisfaction. The more developed the society the more that this is likely to be true. But, at the same time, in becoming a member of civil-society man acquires a new classification of interests. No longer is he directly concerned with survival and satisfaction; these are taken for granted. His social concern is primarily with the means by which survival and satisfaction are brought about and with his relationship to that means. Thus, in society, man's interests are classified in a new dichotomy: his order-dominant interests are those reflecting his concern for the welfare of his community or society; his freedom-dominant interests are those reflecting his need to maintain his individuality.

In sum, because society is incomplete, because no man claims to know perfectly his neighbor, because communication is an imperfect art retarding development of common interests, interests can be described as having a four-fold classification:

(a) Man as a non-social unit in the state of nature:

(1) survival-dominant interests, and

(2) satisfaction-dominant interests;

(b) Man as a member of civil society:

(1) order-dominant interests and

(2) freedom-dominant interests.

Thus the community-formation process -- individual interests to sense of community to community -- is seen to be a process impelled by the character of man's interests. Civil society and community are one and the same and both are illustrative goals rather than definitive expressions of reality. More importantly, both reflect a universal purpose of man -- the pursuit of unity in diversity.

The community-formation process is continuously at work but, lacking a strong enough universal sense of community, the process is much like building sand castles by the sea: the passage of time erases communities the same as it allows them to be built. Business communities, professional communities,

religious communities, cultural communities, racial communities, educational communities, residential communities, scientific communities, family communities, security communities, and of course, political communities are only a few examples of the social diversity which is a product of pursuing individual interests. There are, perhaps, as many kinds of common interests as individual interests and these can lead to larger communities. The more highly developed and integrated is the larger community, the greater the likelihood that its members will generate more common interests. This is so because social development increases the needs of the community. In the same way, the potential for conflict within the community increases with an increase in individual interest. This, too, can result in a realization of common interest. Accordingly, a need for a larger sense of community develops.

IV. COMMUNITY, SOCIETY, AND GOVERNMENT

It is obvious that if communities are as diverse as the examples just cited, there is a probability of conflict not only between different communities of similar composition but also between communities of different types. On the other hand, it is equally obvious that most individuals are members of more than one community -- in fact, it is theoretically possible for them to be members of as

many as those in which their diverse interests are in common with others. Since this can link one community to another through a degree of common membership, a larger sense of community can be developed.

Thus, just as the basis for the most basic or elemental community derives from common interests and a desire to maintain an advantageous sense of community in the face of conflicting interests, so the fact of individual participation in multiple communities tends to create a wider sense of community in the manner of an "interlocking directorate," or matrix. The development is horizontal in that the individual simply belongs to more communities; but it is also vertical in that the individual begins to realize a higher sense of community in his concern for the preservation of the entire framework within which the smaller communities thrive. Note that the larger sense of community is not the result of pyramiding smaller communities; individuals and not communities are the basis for this larger development.

The end result of the vertical development is what is thought of today as the national society. For the future, man can take as his goal a universal society, although such is not a reasonable current goal. The term "society" is used to describe the greater community which embraces all of the lesser communities created

by a given national grouping. As it is known today society is typically an evolutionary product of centuries of human intercourse. Where intercourse between members has been restricted -- whether by tyrannical rule, by poverty of resources, or by natural impediments -- the integration of that society is restricted. That is, there are fewer interests applicable to fewer individuals over a smaller radius of effectiveness. Where intercourse has not been restricted, the development is decidedly more pluralistic (more interests), though not necessarily characterized by strong sense of community. Similarly, the mere existence of multiple interests does not guarantee a strong society (as will be seen in Chapter IV).

The strength of a society is measured in terms of its ability to identify efficiently its public interests which is in turn dependent on the society's capacity for internal communication. Because internal communication is a necessary means of discovering common interests it is one of the characteristics of a society having a highly developed sense of community. However, it should be noted that the most prominent requirement of a strong political community -- the ability to take effective action -- is of less importance to a society than to a government because, in the presence of a well-developed sense of community, public

interests take on the character of a general will, thereby gaining a degree of acceptance which, in theory, requires less administrative and executive power.[8]

As used in practice, the term national society usually involves an unwarranted premise that a particular society is coextensive with the geographic borders and political control of the nation-state. But every nation-state does not have a national society: some have several large ethnic groupings, some appear to be mere collections of people, and still others have societies which are very poorly developed.[9] Thus is exposed the crux of the problem of developing democratic nation-states -- that is, the degree to which a national society exists or can be created which can support stable democratic self-government. Without

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[8] This is not to argue, as did Rousseau, that the general will is always right, nor that consensus is necessarily coercive. The argument is that an awareness of individual interests not only facilitates identification of public interests but encourages acceptance of them. This phenomenon of the integrative process is discussed in the context of "popular acceptance" by Karl W. Deutsch in "Communication Theory and Political Integration," pp. 46-74, Jacob and Toscano (editors), op. cit.

[9] The USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Belgium and the USA are examples of nation-states with more than one unintegrated social grouping; the Congo (K) is an example of a tribal collection; and India is an example of a nation-state with an incompletely developed national society.

such a society, democratic government is like an engine without a fly-wheel, lacking the inertia necessary to stability. There is no force to maintain continuity between past, present, and future. Thus, with an imperfectly developed national society the potential for stable democratic government is correspondingly reduced since the institutions of representative government ensure that the imperfections of society will be reflected.[10]

In Chapter IV it will be seen that there is a basis for comparing national societies to a democratic norm that proportions interests by type (order-dominant or freedom-dominant), by number, and by consensus. In the meantime, a highly developed, integrated society will be considered to be synonymous with a democratic society.

If society is described as having the means of detecting the public interest and as having the institutions, formal or informal, for translating this into effective action, what is the purpose of government?

Government is made necessary by two facts: (1) that society cannot approach theoretical perfection even within nation-states; and (2) that within the international system there actually

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[10] It is a theoretical impossibility to have a general will in an unintegrated society.

exist numerous societies -- in varying stages of development -- which are not part of a greater universal society in any meaningful sense and which therefore must be competent to deal with one another. For example, France and Germany exist side by side, but despite NATO and the Common Market the two national societies are not in any meaningful way part of a larger society; governments are necessary to manage relations between the two societies as well as to harmonize conflicting interests of their own citizens.

Ideally, government should be nothing more than the institutional arrangement necessary to gloss over the inevitable deficiencies within society -- a requirement that has always existed and will continue to exist. It should look inward to its people only and be responsive to people and not to society in a corporate sense. Of course, government is nothing of the sort. Of necessity it looks outward as well as inward and usually considers itself responsible to society as a whole rather than to people.

To sum up, there is no society so completely developed, or integrated, that it can be said to possess a Rousseau-type general will. Furthermore a glance at the national societies underlying nation-states confirms that there are vast differences

in the degree of social integration of the various states.[11] It is not even clear where a large community ends and a small or incomplete society begins. It is only clear that, in terms of "oughts," a nation-state which hopes to be a self-governing democracy ought to have a single, integrated national society which is capable of discerning its public interests. Lacking this social foundation self-government at best is unstable, at worst a means of transition from one degree of anarchy or tyranny to another.

The number of non-representative governments in the world is a fact that should not idly be deplored for the governments are not altogether blameworthy. The objective requirement for government of some sort is generally recognized. However, if there is no social foundation capable of supporting self-government this is a fact which should be considered in the light of the potential for constructing one. The materials might not be so readily at hand. Of more relevance is whether such governments are attempting to develop their societies or merely taking advantage

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[11] For example: India with its multiple societies; Vietnam with its urban-rural dichotomy; Belgium with its Flemish-Walloon dispute; Cyprus with citizens of both Greek and Turkish origin; Nigeria or the Congo with tribal emphasis; with some exceptions, the rich-poor breakdown of most South American countries; the United States with its racial minorities; or the USSR with unintegrated peasantry and Moslems.

of the situation.

Government leaders can -- and some do -- attempt to build national societies on a short range basis employing whatever means their ingenuities can devise -- the foreign bogey, industrialization, nationalism, etc. They can also assume, in the manner of Hobbes, that government and society are the same things; thus whether or not the government is institutionally related to the people it nonetheless asserts the right to speak as the voice of the people. This latter misconception is not far removed, if at all, from the Hegelian state in which the state in effect rejects society as a valid authority in favor of a metaphysical national spirit which transcends in importance the people.

There is no deterministic path from individual interest to sense of community to community to society nor from society to either government or self-government. Mechanistic institutions of democracy can give self expression to the people but they are not adequate to relate individuals to one another in society. Yet it is society which, in perceiving public interests, makes government necessary. Without society the interests of government would tend to be national interests a la Hegel rather than the interests of the people. The interests of the people which would

be represented by a representative government of an inchoate society would at best be common interests of a transient majority, out of date the day after an election. On the other hand, well developed society can give continuity, purpose, and stability to government by linking together its members with the strongest band of all--common interests. That the end result of multiple democratic nation-states is inevitable conflict between themselves is simply convincing evidence that international democracy is no more a panacea for international strife and conflict than totalitarianism.[12] It is as wrong to assume a condition of natural harmony between democratic nation-states as to assume one between socialist states. In either case the various national societies would be extra-social with respect to one another; ultimate harmony would be totally dependent on development of a common society and a government coextensive to it.

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[12] Conflict (not necessarily war or violent conflict) is inevitable because the interests of states overlap. For example, the Saar Basin was of economic value to both France and Germany; choice fishing areas are limited in number and location, yet nations which have a major interest in fisheries are often neighbors competing for the same fish; and pursuit of raw materials and trade markets leads to continuous competition. Thus interests of states are not naturally harmonious. See the excellent discussion of attitudes reference natural harmony in Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, The State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 95ff.

V. ELEMENTS OF THE INTEREST ARGUMENT

The central argument of the community theory is that human nature begets interests which lead to sense of community. Certain aspects of the process, the first of which is matrix formation, need further elaboration.

Matrix Formation

It is simple to conceive of a series of common interests, all different, acting as links between individuals until every member of a group is so joined. However, in this case there would be no single interest common to every member or even to nearly all of them. It is not conceivable that such a chain-linked group could develop a significant sense of community unless we were talking about the same interests. Thus, despite the fact that common interests are the essential element of sense of community, there is more to be explained.

First, it should be noted that a chain-linked group has a precarious future: a change in a few interests can break the chain. Since this is less likely if there is more than one chain of interests, it is reasonable to expect a higher degree of permanence for a group, each member of which has multiple common interests.

Actually, most common interests embrace a number of individuals. Thus the second point to be noted is that the greater

the number of members sharing a common interest, the stronger the sense of community vis a vis those members, and the less the likelihood that the chain will be broken. This is because each link of the chain, or interest, is composed not of one person but of many. And the more people holding an interest, the stronger the link. In sum, the breadth of sense of community is determined by the number of members linked by common interests; permanence and stability are a function of the number of common interests which link them; and strength is related to the number of individuals having the same common interests.[13]

It is implicit that interests common to all the members of a group are more effective in establishing a sense of community, a judgment borne out by the record of such time-tested interests as nationalism, national security, and a common religion. While it is possible for an individual to realize that he is interdependent in a larger sense because of his numerous narrower interests, it

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[13] It should be noted that the strength of sense of community is seen to be directly related to consensus and that no account is taken of variations in the degree, or intensity, of preference. This is because intensity of preference is not in itself a relevant variable. Instead it operates to influence the number of interests a person might have. For example, with respect to interests "W", "X", "Y", and "Z", a very intense feeling for one interest, say interest "W", in preference to interests "X", "Y", and "Z" would, in effect, eliminate that person from the consensus of each of those interests.

is more likely that actual sense of community is a result of community-wide interests. The smaller communities of which an individual is a member simply act to reinforce the larger ones, which are probably less personal and immediate, but which, nonetheless, link individuals in the same way.

To evaluate the sense of community of a group it is necessary: (1) to identify the group's public and significant common interests; (2) to measure the community consensus in support of each interest; (3) to classify the interests as order-dominant or as freedom-dominant; (4) to evaluate their importance to the group (using as a criterion the percent of the group each affects); and (5) to compare the two classifications as to relative number of interests, as to degree of supporting consensus, and as to density of interests of high group importance.[14] The chain-link effect is most important, but extremely difficult to measure (the method proposed in Chapter IV is to measure the number of identical persons in the supporting consensus of any two interests which are ranked next to each other; however, in the absence of empirical data it would probably be necessary to rely on the

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[14] How the above might be accomplished practically is of less importance than the theoretical possibility of doing so. The section in Chapter IV entitled "Description" discusses in general terms a possible approach.

judgment of a person who is a student of that group or society.).

In any event, the value of the matrix study comes with the realization that the term is theoretically quantifiable. Instead of being treated as a lump quantity, it is in fact susceptible of being broken down into the relationship of numbers of identifiable interests and particular individuals.

Interests

Individual interests have been classified, according to whether man is in or out of society, in dichotomies that reflect the consequences of his nature. Other classifications would have been possible: concrete or abstract; inner-directed or other-directed; rational or irrational; material or spiritual. But, they are not pertinent to the argument and, since they do not interfere with its development, have been disregarded.

There are other qualifications to interests, however, which cannot be disregarded. When does a private interest, common or individual, become public? Can public interests be derived except from within society? What is the relationship of public interests to national interests? Is the distinction meaningful?

In Chapter II, reference was made to John Dewey's concept of the public interest -- a private interest whose consequences extend beyond the group pursuing it. This concept is the definition

used herein. It takes note of the fact that an interest is not necessarily public because of the number of persons engaged in it: they can be many or few. The essential condition is one of uncontrolled side-effect. Obviously, there is no implication that the occasion of a public interest requires that the private interests generating it be liquidated simply because a small number of people are responsible for it. The effect on the public may be entirely beneficial, requiring no act of government to control it. It may be productive of more private interests. Or, of course, it may require positive measures to achieve harmony.

Nor is it necessary that private interests arise only from private initiative: it is a valid public interest to stimulate the creation of private interests which might, as a consequence, generate more public interests. But one criterion always pertains: a public interest is inward looking and in the interest of the public as individuals -- a distinction which separates it from national interests.

National interests, on the other hand, are inherently Hegelian. They pertain to the welfare of the state as a corporate creature having a right of existence which is superior to the rights of any of its citizens. Such interests, however deplored, exist unavoidably as a result of the nation-state or international

system. Sovereign equality is supported by an international law which recognizes no rights of private individuals. Not only do nation-states have the right of existence and to take measures to maintain that existence, they also pursue a style of existence. Like individuals, they seek power, wealth, prestige, and security. But it is the form itself -- the nation-state -- to whom these satisfactions are supposed to accrue and not necessarily to its citizens. This is more true of some nation-states than of others; but no nation-state today is without a share of national interests.

National interests can be understood by referring back to the interest classifications used to describe man's actions in the state of nature. That is, nation-states are like super-individuals: they pretend to have personalities, complex "human" natures, the capacity for rational or irrational action, emotional feelings, etc. Moreover they confront one another in a hostile environment that both threatens their security and restricts their efforts at self-satisfaction. Under these conditions, nation-states' interests may be classified as survival-dominant or satisfaction-dominant.

But nation-states, as well as earlier forms, have always had to deal with one another to some degree and in this respect one can consider the international community analogous to a

primitive people community. It is obviously poorly integrated but neither is it in the state of nature.[15] Nation-states, therefore, comprise, in the least, an inchoate society. And, because of this partial social situation, some of their interests may be classified as order-dominant or freedom-dominant.

Assuming that the international system really is analogous to a people community, it would seem to face the same major problem: how to expand and integrate the community in order to make it more complete and to reduce the number and importance of national interests classified as survival or satisfaction-dominant. In a later chapter the difficulties a states-community has on this point will be examined further.

Order and Freedom

Order and freedom are concepts widely used to convey ideas that are generally regarded as universal in their applicability. But,

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[15] The states have numerous private interests, many of which are in common. In many cases these common interests have been recognized and institutions developed to ensure their harmonization. For example, a mutual concern for the safety of ships at sea has led to a convention on the law of the sea. And the specialized Agencies of the United Nations represent another type of institution for the protection of certain mutual interests. For a fascinating contemplation of the inchoate nature of the international system, as well as of states within the system, see Fred W. Riggs, "The Nation-State and Other Actors" in James N. Rosenau (editor) International Politics and Foreign Policy (revised; New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 90-92.

because definitions of them are so lacking in precision, there is considerable disagreement as to what the concepts mean. For example, are they direct opposites? Is freedom the absence of restraint, order the application of restraint? If what is regarded as order and freedom are in fact external evidence of two inner forces of man's nature, as is the writer's belief, can they be realized except in terms of interests?

The last question exposes a major point about order and freedom in society; namely that although one can think of society as the result of a basic need of the individual to balance order and freedom, this can be accomplished only through the medium of interest pursuit. Thus, not only can interests be classified as order-dominant or freedom-dominant, but, of greater importance, order and freedom cannot be regarded as meaningful to society except in terms of interests. It is the concepts of order and freedom which are antithetical; but interests -- although classified as order or freedom-dominant -- can, if diverse enough, allow simultaneous pursuit of both categories.

Obviously, therefore, order and freedom are relative to capability -- the capability to pursue order-dominant or freedom-dominant interests. And to speak of man as by nature free is no more meaningful than to say that by nature he has certain capabilities

relative to his environment. In fact, such capabilities are essentially animal in character, the abilities to think and to communicate being a product of social experience. To maintain that social man is basically free seems more of an affirmation of a capacity for irrationality -- the freedom to pursue interests whose effects are contrary to one's own interests.

Thus, order and freedom have exact definitions when used in the community theory argument. Order is the necessary regulation a society imposes on itself in order to facilitate interest pursuit; freedom is the capability to pursue interests. Both can be quantified in a rough sense by identifying, enumerating, and classifying specific interests. A highly developed and sophisticated society is expected to have a greater capacity for the pursuit of both order and freedom than a lesser developed society.[16] A pluralistic society seems to indicate much freedom, but this may not be so if private interests are so poorly regulated as to interfere with one another; and a traditional society under an autocratic regime might have a relatively large amount of freedom if its citizens are not restrained from pursuing all the interests they are capable of pursuing. Likewise there may be far less order in a

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[16] Cf. Riggs, loc. cit.

totalitarian regime than would appear to exist if there are few interests requiring regulation. Finally, order in some communities may be extremely high with almost no evidence of government regulation if the community is so highly integrated that most individual interests are communicated to most members.[17]

Tyranny and anarchy which are often related to order and freedom, respectively, actually have the opposite relationship: tyranny is the absence of freedom, not the presence of total order; anarchy is the absence of order rather than the presence of total freedom. And since order and freedom are manifested in terms of interests, anarchy and tyranny are the absence of such interests. Order and freedom are characteristics of society; anarchy and tyranny are characteristics of groups which are not socially developed and have no communal matrix. Therefore, it is apparent that just as order and freedom can be realized together, so can anarchy and tyranny. An example would be a simple society governed despotically. And, even though order and freedom are

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[17] A similar phenomenon is discussed by Watkins in connection with Rousseau's contention that primitive societies are superior to more civilized societies: "Modern anthropologists know that the rigid training to which people are subjected in many primitive communities tends to produce a high degree of social integration. By favoring the development of socially acceptable personality traits, this training makes it possible for most individuals to accept their traditional roles with a minimum of personal conflict." Frederick Watkins, The Political Tradition of the West (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 96.

manifested in terms of interests, a society having a lot of interests -- of each type -- can still be both anarchic and tyrannized since the desire to pursue interests is subject to appetite. Anarchy and tyranny are, therefore, always present in the degree to which a society is incompletely integrated.

Law and Liberty

In the real world, order and freedom require a more tangible and responsive framework than that supplied by theoretical concepts. The concepts of law and liberty serve this function. They comprise the attempt to institutionalize the relationship of individuals to government just as interest pursuit is the means by which individuals institutionalize their relationship to society. In neither case is the result foreordained.

Law and liberty are merely the more obvious means of pursuing order and freedom. If they exist in a near vacuum of individual interests they may in fact prove quite meaningless as a means of achieving unity in diversity or order in freedom. For law is generally aimed at regulating interests rather than creating them and liberty is merely the absence of certain restraints; it is not indicative of a capability to pursue interests.

Thus, while law is the backbone of order, it is an institution incapable of producing order by itself; moreover, a society aware

of its public interests and respectful of their priority is capable of a high degree of self-imposed order. It is when the public interest is not clearly perceived by the institutions of government and thereafter communicated to society that the potential for self-imposed order is reduced. For self-restraint cannot be exercised when the requirement for it is not recognized.

Liberty is also an institution. It comprises those guarantees, explicit or implicit, that individuals will be free from certain restraints. It is constitutional to a particular society and represents the minimum environment that society feels is necessary for interest pursuit. Formsof liberty as well as law are, of course, relative to a particular cultural environment.[18]

Public Interests and National Survival

As stated, the community theory argument appears to be saying that private interests arise only from individual initiative, that public interests arise only as a reaction of internal forces to private interests and the need to harmonize conflicting private interests. But this is not the whole story. The stimulus that produces the motivation to pursue a private interest can come from

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[18] The first ten amendments to the U. S. Constitution, the Bill of Rights, is such a statement of liberties. Other societies do not necessarily have the same list. For example, in the USSR there is no private press, nor does the Soviet Constitution guarantee such a private right.

any source including, most especially, a government. The public interest can come about as a result of efforts by public officials and elite groups to actively mold opinion and to lead the public in discussion. And any group, public or private, which is able to communicate effectively with a large portion of society can undoubtedly play a significant role in developing public interests.

However, aside from the above, the public interest has another component deriving from the fact that the relationship of one national society to another is essentially extra-social. As in the fictional state-of-nature, societies confront one another and appear to threaten not only each other's way of life but also each other's survival. Their interests vis-a-vis one another are survival-dominant or satisfaction-dominant. To survive and maintain its social system is the first order of business of a society; its internal interests -- be they order-dominant or freedom-dominant -- cannot be allowed to interfere with such basic concerns.[19]

These concerns are rather similar to what have previously been referred to as national interests. At least they are generated

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[19] However, societies may change their form of government to accommodate internal pressures. Such was the case in 1787 when the people of the United States, through their state governments, discarded the Articles of Confederation in favor of a federal constitution. Likewise, in France the constitution of the Fourth Republic was peaceably replaced by that of the Fifth Republic in 1958.

in the same manner: in the first case by societies facing each other as though they were in the state of nature and in the second by nation-states facing each other in the international or states system. But the difference is an important one. In a society the individual is, by definition, related to the group; and public interests are in his interest. But in the case of nation-states, national interests have to do with the survival and well-being of a form which may or may not bear an institutional relationship to its citizens.

In either case however, the existence of a situation in which societies and nation-states have survival-dominant and satisfaction-dominant interests is indicative of an extra-social relationship. It is this relationship that must be cured before concern for survival and satisfaction can be replaced by concern for order and freedom in the international community.[20]

VI. THE RELEVANCE OF DEMOCRACY TO SOCIETY

The type of society which is the end product of the community-formation phenomenon is, by definition, democratic. That is, it is

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[20] This is not to argue the conclusions. Riggs discusses two models for achieving harmony in relations between states, rejects them both, and speculates on other approaches. Riggs, loc. cit. Here, the emphasis is on the theoretical basis for disharmony rather than to postulate an answer that is probably both unacceptable and undesirable.

the result of interest pursuit, development of a broad sense of community, effective internal interest communication, and perception of the public interest. It is implicit that an integrated society could not emerge if there were not a balance of order and freedom-dominant interests operating within it.

Of course, actual "societies" are something less than perfectly balanced and therefore something less than completely democratic. Moreover, the label society often is used loosely to denote a collection of several societies at one extreme or a mere collection of people at the other. There is a common misassumption, too, that nation-states, ipso facto, have national societies.

Thus a concern for democracy should begin with efforts to perfect the social integration of a group. A society -- that is, a democratic society -- is the foundation for that type of stable self-government known as democratic government. So-called democratic institutions are indeed tried and true instruments for maintaining and perpetuating a social situation. Perhaps they even have some beneficial effect in building society. But, in general, they cannot help being irrelevant if there is no society or if the government structure is not coterminous to it.

VII. GOVERNMENT VS. SOCIETY

A valid concern of social man is that in his efforts to more fully develop society he maintain for himself an outlet for his individuality. In expressing this concern, some have attacked society itself as an instrument of conformity leading to homogeneity and blandness. The Democratic West looks on Socialist efforts to create proletarian societies as being mainly concerned with conformity. Actually, the apparent blandness of the socialist society is more likely an unintended by-product of governmental focus on a reduced number of interests of broad effect while denying a wide range of individual interest pursuits to its citizens.[21] At the other extreme from the conformist society is the society so excessively pluralistic as to exceed its capacity for person-to-person interest communication. In a society with many interests, few of which have broad consensus, anarchy will probably result, or, if not, at least a serious reduction in government's capacity for organic action.

In actuality, society is inherently neither an infringement on man's individuality nor a broadening of his conformist tendencies:

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[21] Taking the Soviet society as an example, it is apparent that the Soviet citizen cannot open his own business, can not freely travel and can not print or publish except through the government.

one of its great attractions is that it neither requires conformity nor does it require individualism. It is as fair to say that social development increases man's capacity for individual expression as it is to say that it increases the scope of order. To paraphrase Niebuhr, through the latter the former is made possible; through the former the need for the latter is conceived. And to pursue as a social goal either order or freedom is simply an expression of ignorance, for it ignores the other variable of a two-variable equation.

It would appear that there is a marked disparity between the real world and the model constructed in this chapter. This is because the model is normative and is intended to be compared and contrasted to real world conditions (see Chapter V). Where one finds what is thought of as democracy, this will be reflected by the model. Of more importance is the use of the model in situations regarded as non-democratic. Comparison of the real world with the model discloses with greater precision that which is missing. It is useful to know, for example, whether the problem is a non-representative, authoritarian government or the degree to which this is merely symptomatic -- and why.

Thus, to the extent that democracy is a reality, it consists of a communicating society linked by numerous common interests, which is aware of and accepts its public interests, and which governs itself through institutions which relate the individual to the governing process. Everywhere one looks there is evidence of the bits and pieces of democracy lying in casual disarray. Here, there may be a true society, a group capable of perceiving and expressing a general will but lacking a representative government;[22] there, there may be a government coterminous with the mood of a national social grouping -- but not necessarily institutionally related to it;[23] and, in a few places, there are societies with governments institutionally related to the individuals who are the citizens.[24]

The reality is that democracy is characteristically measured in relative terms. No part of the world -- be it Yemen, the Soviet Union, or the Peoples' Republic of China -- is unaffected by aspects of the democratic process. Indeed, the strongest totalitarian state needs the same kind of foundation as a democratic state -- a

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[22] This might apply to Czechoslovakia and Poland, for example.

[23] This might describe the Soviet Union, though, of course, the real mood of the Soviet people is not subject to outside study.

[24] The nations of the Democratic West -- the United States, the United Kingdom, for example.

highly developed society; but unlike a democracy, the totalitarian state is at the same time threatened by society since the vitality of a society is related to interest pursuits of individuals rather than those conceived of as in the interest of the state.

Nor is there any part of the world which knows the perfection of democracy. Any minority group which remains essentially a separate community governed by a larger one is subject to the tyranny of one group over another that so bothered James Madison -- whether it is a tolerable tyranny or not.[25] And any nation-state that has a low capacity for internal interest communication usually finds it necessary to fall back on a degree of elite, or authoritarian, leadership to make up for its inability to take concerted action.

Democracy, then, is a social norm of unity in diversity which represents a tolerable balance of order and freedom. This being the case, it is not solely concerned with the internal affairs of a particular society. As long as other societies exist -- even though they are also democratic -- they each represent a threat to one another by virtue of the fact that they have different interests

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[25] See the discussion of "Madisonian Democracy" in Chapter I, Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956, Phoenix ed. 1963), pp. 4-33.

and a most imperfect means of resolving those that conflict. Only a larger social relationship can remove this threat. But again, the reality of present day existence is that there is no all-embracive society and, hence, no basis for a larger political community. Individual interest pursuit is sharply curtailed at national boundaries and with this limitation the development of a broader sense of community is slow and uncertain.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The foregoing argument has attempted to explain how it is meaningful for man to pursue unity in diversity through the medium of society and for society to pursue order in freedom through the medium of the institutionalized political community. Democracy is a special norm of these pursuits, applying both to society and to the political community. The fact that in the real world societies enjoy varying degrees of development -- i.e., extent of common interests -- accounts for the other fact that political communities have varying capacities to support what is thought of as stable democratic self-government. The focus for nation-building efforts should therefore be on the development of democratic societies rather than on the imposition of democratic governmental forms, since the more perfectly democratic these forms, the more precisely will they reflect the disunity,

instability and lack of common purpose of the supporting society.

How a political community in the real world can in theory -- but not precisely -- be quantitatively analyzed to determine the degree to which it has realized or can support democracy is the subject for the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

THE BELL CURVE MODEL

The bell curve concept was briefly introduced in Chapter II. Now that concept is applied to the theoretical statements of Chapter III.

Model Construction

In its simplest form, the bell curve model portrays the balance of order and freedom within a society. As shown in Figure 4, order is represented on the right hand side, freedom on the left; the vertical measurements are conceived to represent the degree of order and freedom.

But, inasmuch as both order and freedom were described as unmanageable and unmeasureable analytical quantities, the concept of interests was introduced. Order and freedom were replaced by order-dominant interests and freedom-dominant interests respectively.

Likewise, consensus with respect to each issue was substituted for degree of order or freedom because consensus can be measured, whereas degree of order or freedom cannot.[1] See Figure 5.

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[1] This emphasis on measurement is not directed toward achieving mathematical precision in defining and interpreting democracy. The point is that democracy is too large and vague a concept for appreciating what is -- in macro-level terms -- a fairly precise set of interdependent variables. Even though the variables cannot be measured accurately, knowledge of their relationship to one another and of the fact that they have dimensions is critical.



Order and Freedom

Figure 4.



Order-Dominant and Freedom-Dominant Interests Versus Consensus

Figure 5

Interests, themselves, are scaled in importance along the abscissa on the basis of the percent of society affected by a particular interest (this is not to be confused with the measure of consensus supporting an interest, which is plotted vertically). Order-dominant interests are scaled in descending order on the right side of the axis from a maximum of unity (100%); freedom-dominant interests are scaled similarly to the left.[2] See Figure 6.

Interests may now be plotted by following a sequence of steps (see Table I):

Step 1 - Within the subject society, identify and ennumerate public interests as well as those other common interests which have a significant impact on that society. Number and list these interests (columns one and two, Table I).

Step 2 - Measure the consensus of each interest and record (column three).

Step 3 - Classify each interest as order-dominant or as freedom-dominant (columns four and five).

Step 4 - Evaluate the importance of each interest

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[2] The abscissa of the standard bell curve, $y = e^{-x^2}$, is simply relabeled: the origin becomes point (0, 1) rather than (0, 0) and the points (0, $\pm$ inf.) become points (0, $\pm \frac{1}{\text{inf.}}$).

Order-Dominant and Freedom-Dominant Interests Versus Consensus

Figure 6.

TABLE I

HYPOTHETICAL DATA FOR CONSTRUCTING BELL CURVE MODEL

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6	Column 7	Column 8
Interest Number	Identification	Public Consensus	Classification O-D	Classification F-D	Degree of Importance	Common Consensus	With Respect to Interest No.
1		80%	x		93%	70%	0
2		80		x	93	70	0
3		78		x	87	68	2
4		74	x		80	67	1
5		70	x		73	62	4
6		70		x	73	64	3
7		65	x		67	57	5
8		65		x	67	56	6
9		58	x		60	52	7
10		51		x	53	50	8
11		41	x		47	40	9
12		41		x	47	38	10
13		31	x		40	27	11
14		31		x	40	29	12
15		20	x		33	17	13
16		20		x	33	20	14
17		10	x		27	8	15
18		10		x	27	11	16
19		3	x		20	3	17
20		3		x	20	4	18

to society, using as a criterion the percent of society affected by it (column six).

Step 5 - Measure the common consensus of adjacent interests of each category -- order-dominant and freedom-dominant -- (adjacent as determined in step 4 above) (column seven).

Step 6 - Plot the data as follows:

(a) Interest consensus is measured from 0 to 100 percent, along the ordinate scale;

(b) Order-dominant interests are positive in sign; freedom-dominant interests are negative;

(c) Interest importance is measured to right or left of the axis.[3]

(d) Interest consensus can now be plotted as a positive vertical line whose height is proportional to the degree of consensus; and

(e) Common consensus is plotted in the same manner with a dotted line to distinguish from individual interest consensus plots. (See Figure 7).

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[3] By definition, an interest which affects 100% of society would be of maximum importance; interests of lesser impact would be scaled to right or left of the axis.


Gross Consensus
Common Consensus
Governmental Axis
Bell Curve Norm
Gross Sense of Community
Actual Sense of Community
CONSENSUS (%)
100
75
50
25
25
50 (%) 75
100
75 (%) 50
25
Freedom-Dominant Interests
Order-Dominant Interests
Sense of Community

Figure 7.

Step 7 - Construct three curves:

(a) A standard bell curve to serve as a norm;

(b) Sense of community (gross) which is based on the plot of individual interest consensus; and

(c) Sense of community (actual) which is based on the plot of common consensus.

Step 8 - Compare by inspection the two sense of community curves noting:

(a) Their shapes in comparison to the norm;

(b) The symmetry of one side with respect to the other; and

(c) The relative density of interests plotted on each side of the origin.

Step 9 - As a final step in construction of the graphical model a vertical axis representing the relationship of government to the various interest groups within the subject society is erected at the point closest to the mid-point of the group with which it identifies.[4] In effect, this step adds to

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[4] The more integrated a society, the less the importance of a single interest group and the more valid the concept of the individual relating to society as a whole. Nonetheless, the government may still identify with particular interests rather than interest groups and such disparity between the overall balance of government aims and those of society is one measure of the imperfection of the government-society relationship.

the portrayal only a single dimension of the very complex government-society relationship. It is of greatest meaning when considering a poorly developed society which embraces semi-isolated social groups only a small number of which are relevant to the exercise of political power.[5] The vertical axis indicates with which interests or interest groups the government identifies.

Figure 7 portrays a more or less "ideal" society: the three curves -- bell curve norm, gross sense of community and actual sense of community -- follow a path that differs only in magnitude of consensus. The society is assumed to be democratic because the majority of the population is embraced in interest pursuits that reflect a concern for both order and freedom; it is stable because the consensus with respect to disparate issues is both a common consensus and representative of a majority of the population. Note, also, that in the ideal case the government axis is shown to be coincident with the axis of the three curves.

Description

The two fundamental factors of social existence are common interests and public interests. It is their existence which makes

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[5] The purpose of this step is to graphically depict where the governmental axis actually is with respect to society (as shown by the sense of community curves); where the governmental axis ought to be will be discussed later.

possible the pursuit of multiple individual interests which, though they may be relatively restricted in scope, may be virtually unrestricted in number and diversity. Thus, the first step in a bell curve analysis was to identify these interests and to list them (in columns one and two, Table I).[6]

Actual determination of interest consensus can be accomplished either directly by measurement, or indirectly by judgment. For example, the direct way would apply opinion sampling techniques to each interest identified. This method has been proven to be fairly accurate when utilized in many Western countries and might now be employed in other portions of the world. In the United States, the Gallup, Harris and Roper polls are representative examples of the method.

A more practical approach is for the analyst to simply judge these values on the basis of objective and comprehensive study of the area. If, at some future time, low cost opinion sampling techniques can be developed, they could be used to supplement

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[6] "National" interests are not a part of this list. They are pertinent to international relations and to the personalities of states, as discussed in Chapter III. However, to the extent that these survival-dominant and satisfaction-dominant interests of a state have effect internally on members of society, the effects may be classified as order-dominant or freedom-dominant, as the case may be, and included in the list.

the analyst's judgment.[7]

The classification of interests is accomplished by using this yardstick: does the interest reflect a primary concern to conserve or improve order? Or does it reflect a concern to maintain or increase freedom? Like the previous step, this is a question of judgment, and hard and fast guidelines are not offered.

However, in arriving at a measure of the relative importance of interests, a guide is used: importance of an interest is assumed to be proportional to the percent of a society it directly affects. The measure may be empirical, if the means of survey are available and practicable, or it may be subjective.

The final step is one of the most critical and, at the same time, one of the most inherently difficult: the measuring of common consensus. As indicated in step 5, common consensus is a measure of the number of identical persons included in the consensuses of two adjacent interests. If interests are linked together not by any similarity of the interests themselves but instead by the identity of the individuals sharing the interests

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[7] The results in either case could hardly be termed objective to the degree that the efforts of independent analysts could be added together. In theory this would be possible; in fact, the actual process of interest identification and establishing the criteria therefor would be subject to the varying judgments of different analysts.

then a matrix of interests exists which ties the various individuals together. Since one interest consensus in fact may be comprised, at least initially, of completely different persons than that of another, it is important to determine the extent of common consensus in a society in order to learn which interests of a society have a divisive effect and which have a unifying effect.[8] Common consensus is indicative of a nation's actual sense of community. It is bound to be less than gross sense of community, because no two people can be expected to have all the same interests. See Figure 7, where actual sense of community is depicted as everywhere less than gross sense of community, and compare columns three and seven, Table I.

Thus, in this final step, it can be seen that the degree to which all of the major interests of society are linked together, by elements of a common consensus, is the real measure of the social fabric. Common consensus is a matrix, an interlocking web, which can bind even the outer fringes of society to the more stable center. This explains the underlying appeal of "center-of-the-road" politics in a highly developed society; at the same time

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[8] For example, in the United States the concept of black separatism is obviously divisive; the question of a particular income maintenance scheme, however, has an unknown effect since it is not known if the people who would support such a scheme are a particular group separated from the rest of society or whether the scheme's supporters also share a significant number of interests with the mainstream of American society.

it illustrates the fallaciousness of the idea that political candidates should be as different as possible merely to give the voter a more dramatic choice.[9]

The Government-Society Relationship

In Figure 7, a vertical axis said to represent the point in society where a particular government was institutionalized was erected. But what does it mean? How should government and society be related?

It is taken for granted in the West that governments should be native, that persons comprising a government should be members of the society governed. Still, this solves very little -- for there have been far more home-grown, local varieties of tyranny (and anarchy) than of the foreign or imperial sort. And it is because of this that the very hallmark of Western democracy has been the extraordinary extent to which societies have sought to protect themselves from their own governments.

However, it is not the means by which government and society are related which is the point of concern.[10] These

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[9] Such a dramatic choice in fact represents the two fringes of society rather than the portion of society -- and it should be the largest portion -- which has a strong communal matrix.

[10] Means such as majority rule, universal suffrage, one-man-one-vote, checks and balances, etc.

means may be good or bad, democratic or non-democratic depending on the relationship between government and society which they institutionalize. The relationship is the crucial measure of political democracy. In a phrase, government ought to be responsive to the needs of society; this is the proper or normative relationship.[11] If this condition is achieved, it makes no difference how complicated or simple, how formal or informal the institutions or conventions employed.

The significance of using the bell curve for illustrating such a simple and general proposition is that the needs of society are already graphically represented in terms of interests and consensus; and a government shown to be institutionally related to the portion of society identified with the greater part of these interests is a more democratic government than one which represents one extreme or the other. Thus, the axis of the bell curve of the society which bisects the area of greatest common interest is the norm for that society. It is irrelevant that these interests may seem peculiar, superficial or inadequate

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[11] Again, the virtue of such a responsive relationship is dependent on the degree of social development, or integration. A poorly integrated society is not likely to reach agreement on what their needs are; a highly integrated society, on the other hand, by definition has the capacity to defer individual, or private, interests to the public interest.

by a different society; it is irrelevant that it was a government which first made the society aware of or desirous of those needs; and it is irrelevant if the stimulus which provoked a social need was of foreign origin.

Thus, with reference to Figure 7, if it can be determined that a government is responsive to a particular area or class of interests, then a second vertical axis may be erected. Obviously it will never really coincide with the norm, or bell curve, axis, if for no other reason than the unavoidable time lag involved in democratic processes. Nonetheless, the separation between the two axes is graphical evidence of the gap, if any, between ideal democratic government and reality; just as the shape of the sense of community curve as compared to the bell curve norm is a measure of democracy within a community.

As noted in Chapter III, reality is usually far removed from model building. If the bell curve is the normal expression of democratic society and government, then there are few governments which can be so described. As a result, in portraying the government-society relationship with reference to the bell curve model there are three axes which should be considered: First, the norm, which is the bell curve axis; second the axis bisecting the area of greatest interest density on the actual curve of a society; and

third, the vertical axis erected nearest the interests with which an actual government identifies and to which it is responsive irrespective of whether or not this responsiveness is in accord with democratic institutions. Figure 8 illustrates the three government-society axes.

Discussion

Since the communal matrix of a society is in reality the strength and breadth of its common interests, it can be seen that the curve of common consensus which denotes actual sense of community is synonymous with the communal matrix. If the matrix is likened to a chain or rope it is obvious that the ability of a society to internally communicate with itself through common interests is strongest where common consensus is highest. In the same fashion, the greater the number of interests embraced, the greater the diversity of that society. Thus a society bound together by interests is inherently an expression of unity in diversity. The question is how much unity, how much diversity?

Why the bell curve? There is no mathematical argument to support the use of the bell curve as the norm of society. It just seems to lend itself to the theory in a pragmatic way. As an expression of unity in diversity it has these features:



Government-Society Axes

Figure 8.

First, the highest consensus supports interests of the highest priority. This would mean that the potential for political action in a state with a socially responsive government would be highest for the interests of most importance.

Second, it provides for separately classifying and plotting the two forces which are the fundamental components of any public interest: freedom and order.

Third, it shows that a society must be composed of people who individually have an appreciation of the need for both freedom-dominant and order-dominant interests. If some individuals professed a concern for only one class of interests and other individuals a concern for the second category, there would be in effect two separate societies pretending that they were only one -- which, to a degree, is precisely what has happened in societies that mistakenly have conceived of freedom and order as opposite rather than interdependent goals.

Fourth, the curve includes "fringe" interests supported by only a weak consensus on either edge of society. This is important because it reveals a fact often overlooked in the tyranny of majority rule: that many of the ideas that keep a society vital originate on society's fringe as ideas having little mass support. These interests, then, are important to the health of society and

must be included within its communal matrix even though they may initially enjoy only a small consensus.[12]

Why, one might ask, not posit a plateau, as in Figure 9, rather than the bell curve as a norm? The answer to this is that in the nature of things it would set forth a utopian, or ultimate, situation which could not bear any resemblance to reality. For example, if a new idea originated as a low priority interest, the norm would demand immediate acceptance by a 100 percent consensus. Moreover, although freedom and order-dominant interests are not inherently opposites, in some cases they are and a plateau-shaped curve would imply that the interests could not be even theoretically plotted; for the consensus of one could not possibly be a part of the consensus of the other without contradicting itself.

The political-social relationship. The actual shape of either the gross consensus or the common consensus curve of a real society is likely to bear no resemblance to the bell curve norm. Why this is so is not the direct concern of this thesis. It is sufficient to observe that it has to do with a great number of dynamic factors present in any society -- means of communication, conflict of

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[12] By definition public interests must operate within society; an interest that seeks to destroy or damage society is extra-social and must be the responsibility of the government to counter, as it would any other threat to survival.



Plateau-Shaped Curve

Figure 9.

social values and institutions, such as religion, low general educational level, inadequate regulation of private interests, and so forth. But the implications of different shaped curves are significant. For example, if the area under the common consensus curve is divided so that the area on the right of a vertical axis equals that on the left, then presumably this line -- the virtual axis -- is the line about which a government responsive to social forces would stabilize itself. See figure 8.

But again in real societies, no matter how democratic, there is a lag between governmental response to society's needs and the focal plane of public interests (the virtual axis). Indeed in many cases, the lag is a permanent gap.[13] In other societies, governmental action may deliberately shift the political axis further away from the virtual axis. In any case the political axis should be determined by independent observation and placed on the graph in accordance with the judgment of the analyst. Although the mechanics and dynamics of the political-social relationship are beyond the scope of this thesis, some implications are apparent.

First, the wider the gap between the virtual axis and the

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[13] In figure 8, the lag (or gap) is represented by the distance between the two dotted lines.

political axis, the greater the tension between government and society. The government, if responsive to social pressure, can be expected to undergo changes that will bring it closer to the virtual axis; if not responsive to social forces, the government can be expected to increase the coercive force needed to retain control.

Second, institutions of peaceful change are desirable in order to institutionalize the government-society relationship and keep the gap as small as possible.

Third, the absence of institutions of peaceful change between government and society indicates that if the government's means of coercion should weaken then there is no reliable means of avoiding incipient internal conflict.

Thus, in the many nations of the world where the government is essentially coercive it is not enough to attempt reform by curtailing government use of coercive power to maintain order. Such coercion may be tyranny but the reform is likely to produce anarchy since those same actions also tend to have interest-starved societies and, consequently, little capacity for self-imposed order. As a minimum step, an institutional relationship must be established between society and government. Yet, this too is hardly enough if the society is so underdeveloped that its

interest spectrum provides only a weak or non-existant communal matrix; the step could institutionalize anarchy or at best instability.

More than anything, a society's capacity for self-government is a direct function of its interest development. And, as has been already argued, every public interest has either a freedom component or an order component. The road to democratic self-government is not a simple one.

Some examples. Figures 10 - 12 are examples of what might be expected if certain types of societies were graphed. All are speculative; none are empirical. Chapter V will discuss a wider range of examples in terms of their implications for democracy.

Figure 10 depicts a traditional society, such as existed in Iran prior to the Shah's reform efforts: The two "humps" in this society suggest that there are in reality two societies living side by side within the same national boundaries. The narrowness of both humps reflects the underdevelopment (small number of interests) of the society. The location of the virtual axis is of no significance to either of the two preponderant groups of the society. The political axis, stabilized about the order-dominant interests of the wealthy landholders on the right, is maintained by the extra-social coercive power of the government's monopoly on



Sense-of-Community: Traditional Society

Figure 10.

force. The saddle between the two humps represents a weak communal matrix based on national traditions, culture, and religion.

Figure 11 shows what might be taken at first glance for a healthy democratic society with multiple interests and a government responsive to social forces. However, the distribution of interests is in small pockets of society; the individuals comprising each of these pockets have only a narrow range of interests. Therefore the matrix is weakened by the absence of links between these groups. Such a situation might be assumed to be what existed in France prior to De Gaulle when political parties tended to represent a narrow range of interests rather than a broad spectrum.

Figure 12 shows how a pluralistic democratic society, such as the United States, might appear if graphed. Note the low consensus on most interests and the preponderance of freedom-dominant interests with the political axis stabilized in close proximity to the virtual axis. The combination of interest diversity and low consensus implies a considerable reliance on self-regulation since governmental action is impeded by the low consensus.

Conclusion. Chapter III and IV have attempted to set forth a theoretical basis for the quantification of the concept of democratic



Sense-of-Community: Weak, Democratic Society

Figure 11.



Sense-of-Community: Pluralistic Society

Figure 12

government. Additionally, a theoretical norm has been developed for the purpose of evaluating the quality of actual governments. In fact, no such absolute validity is intended since the practical barriers to accurate and meaningful measurement are probably insurmountable. What is significant is the knowledge that there are underlying theoretical bases for quantification and comparison.

While it is obvious that the bell curve model can reveal nothing that does not in the first instance depend on diligent research and which could therefore be determined without construction of the curves, the model does have the virtue of presenting a number of complex factors in such relationship to one another that a brief examination provides visual correlation and is sufficient to diagnose the potential of a society to support self-government.

Moreover, while it is not intended to predict events, it can help to predict the effects of contemplated measures. For example, in Figure 10, depicting the traditional society, suppose that international pressures were brought to bear on the government to permit greater civil liberties. All other things being equal the net result can be expected to be greater instability -- at least initially -- since it increases government responsiveness to a society that has few common interests and has a weak

communal matrix between two significantly dissimilar groups. The implication is that in order to effect reform in such societies the coercive power of the government will have to be utilized to avoid anarchy during the period that interest creation is being stimulated and developed.

How to develop interests or to stimulate their development is obviously a matter of enormous concern in a world seeking to stabilize itself. Research in this area is already broad and vigorous.[14] The bell curve simply reminds one that until common interests are created, the basis for self-government does not exist and paternal tyrannies which are dedicated to social development are perhaps to be preferred to an anarchy promising to go nowhere.[15]

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[14] For example, the efforts to assist developing countries establish schools, government bureaucracies, economic and social infrastructures, etc.

[15] This is not to argue that even paternalistic tyranny will be appreciated, respected or, in the end, tolerated. But see Barrington Moore, Jr.: "...if we take the seventh decade of the twentieth century as our point of observation, while continuing to realize that like all historical vantage points it is arbitrarily imposed, the partial truth emerges that nondemocratic and even antidemocratic modernization works." (In Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p. 159.).

CHAPTER V

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE BELL CURVE MODEL

I. INTRODUCTION

The rich diversity of social settings in the states which comprise the international system and the different ways in which national societies are related to their governments would appear to argue that all states are significantly different in the vital areas of government form and social organization.[1] The bell curve model provides a means of graphically depicting both differences and similarities in a way that can aid both quantitative and qualitative analysis.

II. LIMITING FORMS

Before considering the use of the model for analytical purposes, the different ways in which curves can depart from the bell curve norm ought to be considered. These departures might be thought of as tending towards limits established by the limiting values which can be assigned to the model variables. As limiting

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[1] Cf. Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967) which compares the revolutionary backgrounds of three Western democracies with the modernization processes of three Asian states (England, France, and the United States and China, Japan, and India respectively). See also Abdul A. Said, Theory of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968), particularly "The Impact of the Emergence of the Non-West Upon Theories of International Relations," pp. 93-106, and the discussion on pp. 10-11 ("...it is also impossible to deny the problems and aspirations common to Westerners and non-Westerners...).

forms, they, of course, bear only an exaggerated relationship to real-world situations.

If we consider only the four major model variables -- number of common interests, extent of common consensus, sense of community, and type of government-society relationship -- and assign three values to each, a possible total of 81 reference forms results. If only the two limiting ranges of values are assigned -- an upper and a lower -- the number of reference forms can be reduced to 16 and they can be thought of as theoretical limits. See Table II for a listing of possible ranges of values.

Each of the 16 limiting forms need not be examined to see how they affect interpretation of the curves. However, a sufficient number of possibilities, including median cases, will be considered to illustrate how the norm can be used for comparative analysis.

Variations in the Number of Common Interests

Assuming a moderate common consensus, a single-lobe sense of community,[2] and a representative form of government, variations in the number of common interests would produce curves which fall between the limiting forms depicted in Figure 13. If

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[2] This term as well as "double-lobe" and "multiple-lobe" will be discussed under "Variations in Sense of Community" in connection with the explanation of Figure 15.

TABLE II

DATA FOR LIMITING FORMS

I.	Number of Interests	Few*	Moderate	Numerous*
II.	Extent of Common Consensus	Low*	Moderate	High*
III.	Sense of Community	Single* Lobe	Double Lobe	Multiple* Lobe
IV.	Type of Government-Society Relationship	Direct* (Democratic)	Representative	Autocratic*

* Values for limiting forms



Effect of Variations in the Number of Common Interests

Figure 13.

social stability is taken to be proportional to the horizontal breadth of the curve,[3] it can be seen that stability decreases as the number of common interests decreases. This in turn implies that the lower the number of common interests, the more dangerous becomes direct democratic government and, to a lesser extent, representative government.[4] This is because the impact of change or disruption to a few important interests in a society where they are already few in number is considerably more pronounced than would be the case if there were numerous other interests to exercise a moderating effect.[5]

Variations in the Extent of Common Consensus

Figure 14 shows the effect of varying common consensus, all other variables remaining constant -- that is, number of common interests is assumed to be moderate, sense of community to be single-lobed, and type of government to be representative.

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[3] As was argued in Chapter III, social stability is directly related to the number of common interests.

[4] Assuming that the more efficient the democratic political institutions, the more effectively they will reflect the degree of stability or instability in the supporting society.

[5] Note also that the probable effect of a highly intense feeling with respect to an interest or a group of interests is to exclude those sharing such intense feelings from a broader range of interests and thus to promote an inherently unstable situation -- i.e., the fewer the interests, the greater the inherent instability.



Effects of Variations in the Extent of Common Consensus

Figure 14.

All three variations are shown to have the same breadth, with only the height of each curve varying. The implication is that the meaning of a variation in common consensus can be inferred by comparison of an actual curve with the norm. There is also an implication with respect to stability for, in addition to number of common interests, the extent of common consensus is a direct measure of the stabilizing impact of interests within a society. The final inference from this family of curves has to do with a society's ability to influence the course of government: the higher the consensus, the more influential the society.

Variations in Sense of Community

Reference has been made to single, double, and multiple lobe sense of community. These terms are peculiar to the bell curve model, describing the shapes of certain of the reference curves. The situations which they depict are, of course, real.

Single lobe sense of community refers to a community that is substantially homogeneous, having a single body of common interests binding it together. The extent of common consensus and the number of common interests are not directly relevant to the condition described.

Double lobe and multiple lobe sense of community describe non-homogeneous situations in which there are two, or more,

groups of common interests with different people, for the most part, in the different groups. Thus there is a weak or non-existent matrix of common interests binding the different groups together. The basis for the different groups within a single national society may be ethnical, linguistic, religious, wealth, or other but the important fact in such cases is that there are an inadequate number of common interests having a sufficient common consensus to override the narrower groups of interests. In other words, the effect of the interests is unifying so far as the group holding them in common is concerned; so far as other groups, or society as a whole, are concerned the effect is divisive since the smaller groups' interests are such as to preclude their sharing those of the larger group. Figure 15 compares a single lobe society with a double lobe society. A triple lobe society would be similar except that the potential for common consensus would be correspondingly reduced.

Figure 16 shows a double lobe society in which there is a marked disparity in the common consensus of the two groups. The basis for such a disparity in most cases probably has more to do with the basic population figures for each group but it could also reflect the degree of social integration of the different groups.

The most obvious implication of the double or multiple lobe



Single and Double Lobe Sense-of-Community

Figure 15.



Unequal Double hobe Sense-of-Community
Figure 16.

situation is that there is no way in which democratic government can reflect the interests of society as a whole.[6] In Figure 15, a mid-point between the two groups pleases nobody, while representing the interests of one of the two groups amounts to tyranny over the other. In the situation shown in Figure 16, actual experience would indicate that either a small oligarchical class tyrannizes the masses or a majority permanently tyrannizes a minority.

In any case, the presence of a separate group which cannot integrate or simply has not integrated into the larger society presents a difficult problem of government. More on this will be discussed in the next section.

Type of Government-Society Relationship

For ease of classification three kinds of government-society relationships have been identified. The democratic relationship is a hypothetical situation in which the government is directly responsive to the expressed interests of society whether passing fancy or deeply-felt need. The representative relationship is also responsive to the expressed interests of society but is accountable over a prescribed period rather than issue by issue. The auto-

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[6] Cf. Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (Phoenix Edition), 1963), particularly Chapter III, "Polyarchal Democracy" and Chapter IV, "Equality, Diversity, and Intensity," which discuss the difficulty of representing in a democratic way the interests of minority groups.

cratic relationship describes all those situations in which government is not institutionally accountable to society.

In Chapter IV,[7] the government-society axis was discussed at some length and Figure 8 illustrated three different axes -- the axis of the bell curve norm, the axis bisecting the area of greatest common interests, and the axis closest to the group of interests with which government policy is identified. Figure 17 shows how these axes relate to a society having a moderate number of common interests, a moderate common consensus, and a single lobe sense of community. The displacement between the "direct democratic axis" and the bell curve axis is a function of the difference between the actual society and the bell curve norm; the displacement between the "representative axis" and the "direct democratic axis" can be due to either a natural lag of the government responding to society or it can represent a lead a government takes in attempting to mold society; and, finally, the displacement of the "autocratic axis" is simply indicative of the fact that government is not institutionally related to society and is following a different light. In this last case, if an autocratic government actually were to respond to society's needs, it's axis might coincide with either of the others, thus

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[7] pp. 91-92 and pp. 95-98.



Government-Society Relationship
(Single-Lobe Sense-of-Community)

Figure 17.

indicating a case of "benevolent despotism" or "guided democracy,"

Figure 18 shows the difficulty inherent in attempting to establish a government-society relationship in a society having a double lobe sense of community. There is no theoretically perfect point at which the government-society relationship "ought" to be stabilized. Such a condition as that shown in Figure 18 might be said to describe a traditional society prior to social revolution; if the actual axis were near the democratic axis, it might describe such a society after its social revolution. In any case this figure dramatically illustrates the social imperative associated with democratic government: democratic government is impossible with a multiple-lobe sense of community. Majority rule would be just what Madison said it was -- a tyranny of the majority over a minority, or minorities.

III. SOME BELL CURVE MODELS

It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to accumulate the sort of real data with which bell curve models of actual nations could be prepared. It is possible, however, to construct hypothetical models by substituting non-empirical aggregates for the needed data. Table III is an example of how this can be done, the gross values therein being merely estimates made for the sake of demonstration. Figures 19 through 24 were prepared from the



Government-Society Relationship
(Double Lobe Sense-of-Community)

Figure 18.

TABLE III

HYPOTHETICAL AGGREGATE DATA FOR SELECTED NATIONS

Nation	Number of Common Interests	Extent of Common Consensus	Sense of Community	Government-Society Relationship
Bolivia	F	M	S	R
Brazil	M(-)	L	D	A
Canada	M	M	D	A
China	F(+)	M	S	A
Congo	F	L	T	A
Cuba	F	H	S	A
Czechoslovakia	M(-)	M	D	A
France	N	L	S	R
Greece	M	M(-)	S	A
India	F(+)	L	M	R
Israel	M	H	S	R
Italy	N(-)	M(-)	S	R
Japan	N	H	S	R
Mexico	M(-)	M(-)	S	R
Nigeria	F	L	M	A
R.O.K.	M(-)	H	S	R
S.V.N.	F	L	M	A
Spain	M(-)	M(-)	S	A
Sweden	N	H	S	R
Taiwan	M(-)	M	S	A
Turkey	M(-)	L(+)	S	R
U.A.R.	F(+)	H	S	A
U.K.	N	M(-)	S	R
U.S.A.	N	M(-)	D	R
U.S.S.R.	M(-)	L(+)	M	A
Yugoslavia	F(+)	L(+)	D	A

F-Few	L-Low	S-Single Lobe	D-Democratic
M-Moderate	M-Moderate	D-Double Lobe	R-Representative
N-Numerous	H-High	M-Multiple Lobe	A-Autocratic
		T-Tribal	

data in Table III.

The United States

As shown in Figure 19, the United States has a double lobe sense of community. In fact, the minor lobe, which represents a large, unintegrated minority -- the negro population -- might well be three lobes if Mexican-Americans and American Indians were treated separately.[8] The government, while representative, tends to be somewhat more liberal than the major lobe of society, a fact which is indicated by the location of the government-society axis in the area of freedom-dominant interests.

The camel-back between the two lobes reflects the absence of a strong matrix connecting the two groups. The low consensus as compared to the norm implies some difficulty in mobilizing public support when programs of action are required.

Cuba

Cuba has few common interests compared to most Western European nations. However, Figure 20 shows a sharp

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[8] It is important to remember that the presence of this lobe is not automatic by virtue of the group's ethnic difference; the lobe represents interests, not people, and the fact that a particular group of people in American society have substantially dissimilar interests from society as a whole -- i.e., they are unintegrated. Thus, the many other identifiable groups in society -- ethnic, religious, professional, business, or cultural -- do not show up as separate lobes because they are integrated into many other groups as well.



Bell Curve Model of the United States

Figure 19.



Bell Curve Model of Cuba

Figure 20.

spike[9] of high consensus interests which reflects the intense national feeling with respect to the integrity of Cuba's sovereignty. The sense of community is essentially single lobe and the autocratic government favors order-dominant interests.

With such a narrow sense of community curve, the society would tend to be unstable if the government were responsive to social pressures. This is because the only interests having a significant consensus are largely emotional ones which are susceptible to abrupt change. A representative government would have great difficulty achieving stability until more interests with greater consensuses grasped the public consciousness.

India

Whether or not India should be represented as having a multiple lobe sense of community can be debated since it is difficult to judge whether her polyglot society is a group of separate societies or a single society with a very low common consensus and having relatively few common interests. This is an excellent example of a situation where the ability to objectively measure interests and consensus would allow the bell curve model

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[9] This spike is characteristic of lesser developed nations which have few interests but intense national feeling; it might be thought of as the "throw out the imperialists" curve.



Bell Curve Model of India

Figure 21.

to aid in the analytical process. That is, if the raw data on interests were available, comparison with the bell curve norm would give an immediate interpretation of whether India's problem is one of developing consensus for existing interests or creating a great many more common interests -- or both. Figure 21 is based on the assumption, which may well be incorrect, that India's sense of community is multiple-lobed. In this case, the depressions between the different lobes are not so significant with respect to limiting the matrix of common interests as is the generally low common consensus. In any case, India's government is fairly independent of public pressures except with regard to such matters as food supply and Pakistan. The "spike," which is characteristic of underdeveloped countries, is similar to that of Cuba.

South Vietnam

The bell curve model of South Vietnam is both double and triple lobed with respect to sense of community. The urban-rural dichotomy is sharp but so is the trichotomy of religious sects;[10] and if all of Vietnam were lumped together there would be at least one more trichotomy of north (Hanoi), south (Saigon), and center (Hue). If, in fact, empirical data did result in a curve such as

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[10] Buddhist, Cao Dai, and Catholic.



Bell Curve Model of South Vietnam

Figure 22.

the one hypothesized in Figure 22, it might be interpreted as follows: sense of community is multi-lobed with a deficient matrix of interests to link the whole population; the number of common interests is low and common consensus is lacking in all interest areas except that of national security, where there are two "spikes" reflecting the division of allegience of the population; the government is autocratic and tends to identify with the more conservative order-dominant interests; the prospects for political stability are non-existent for a responsive representative government of any political stripe leaving only the alternative of a strong government substantially free of pressures from social groups.

Sweden

If Sweden's unintegrated Lapp population is omitted, its sense of community curve follows the bell curve norm closely, both number of interests and common consensus being above most other so-called democratic nations. See Figure 23. However, it will be observed that the curve is translated somewhat to the left of the norm, reflecting a tendency of Swedish society to favor freedom-dominant interests. The government-society relationship is stabilized somewhat to the right, in the area of order-dominant interests, although the axis is actually a little to the left of the axis of the bell curve norm.



Bell Curve Model of Sweden

Figure 23.

Czechoslovakia

Authoritarian regimes can give an appearance of greater unity than may actually be the case. Czechoslovakia, like Yugoslavia, does not have a single national society. However, the Czechs and the Slovaks have more common interests than many societies which are the product of a single culture. Thus, although Figure 24 shows a double lobe sense of community, the depression between the lobes is not so sharp -- a matrix of common interests does exist. From an overall point of view, the number of common interests is deficient and the common consensus is only moderate, except on the question of national independence where a sharp spike is a factor of unity for the whole population. Note that the entire spectrum of interests is displaced far to the left, in the region of freedom-dominant interests, while the government axis has recently experienced several radical shifts from the region of order-dominant interests to the region of freedom-dominant interests and back again.[11] The government itself never lost its autocratic character, though it at one time showed indications that it might.

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[11] During the period January 1968 - July 1969.



Bell Curve Model
of Czechoslovakia
Figure 24.

CHAPTER VI

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

What is the relevance of the idea of democracy to the international system? Is it possible to have democracy at the international level? Or is it more likely that such a proposition is a theoretical impossibility? Is it even desirable that the two things -- democracy and the international system -- be brought together in some structural relationship?

One point seems obvious: the international system is concerned with states whereas democracy is concerned with people. Although in certain respects states may appear similar to people -- even affecting some of their political rights, their individual attributes, and their emotions -- there is a crucial difference: states don't really exist; they are legal fictions created by the various national societies to serve social -- that is, human -- needs. People, on the other hand, do exist; how they are related to one another and to their governments is what democracy is about. Thus, the fact that democracy and the international system have different terms of reference seems a good reason to look more closely into the questions raised in the opening paragraph. First, however, let us reflect further on the nature of the inter-

national system.

II. OPERATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The international system might be thought of as a marvellous imperfection that has evolved over the more than three hundred years since the Peace of Westphalia and the initial acceptance of Grotius' eclectic concept of international law.[1] The system has shown the ability to accommodate such practices as the balancing of power and the dividing of portions of the world into spheres of influence. It has tolerated a great variety of bilateral and multilateral arrangements. It has withstood the ambiguity of experiments in internationalism and regional organization. It has survived a succession of wars and organized barbarity that have snuffed out the lives of countless millions and which often have had the effect of reorganizing the political cartography of the globe. Surely a form so tolerant of hopeful experiment and which can stand such abuse and absorb such disintegrative forces and yet still provide a useful regulatory framework would seem an ideal political form for so imperfect a creature as man.

The question, however, is not one of tolerability but of sufficiency. Even though the system can provide a framework for

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[1] Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, 1625.

the resolution of conflict, can promote peaceful change (or at least promote experiments that have that aim), and, on occasion, can support policing actions by an outraged majority against the perpetrators of outrage it still cannot ensure that these things will happen nor can it even provide a reasonable basis for such a hope. In short, while the international system can be characterized as a necessary arrangement, from the standpoint of performance it can at the same time be characterized as inadequate.

The members of the international system are, of course, aware of the system's performance shortcomings. They are also aware that the system's inability to manage peaceful change threatens civilization, humanity, even existence. But for a variety of reasons that are not pertinent to this discussion no alternative has been found acceptable. Instead efforts of the major powers to make the system work have been focused on improving statesmanship, recognizing the sources of conflict, and communicating one another's interests.

Whether or not the international system can accommodate institutions which would ensure peaceful change cannot be predicted. However, the system's two problem areas can be easily identified: (1) there is no extant sense of community to support mutual trust and confidence whether between states or between people of

different states; and (2), the international system is not a system at all. The latter problem area has to do with cybernetics, or management theory, and is of interest in this discussion because feedback -- a central requirement of a purposeful, dynamic system -- is also central to the healthy functioning of democratic government.[2] The international system has no institutions, lacks purpose and dynamism, cannot incorporate feedback, and has no centralized decision-making authority.

The problem of sense of community in the international system is analogous to the same problem at the national level.[3] The next section will employ the bell curve model to illustrate its applicability.

III. THE BELL CURVE MODEL AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The examples in Chapter V employed hypothetical data and a priori assumptions to give a rough idea of how the potential for

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[2] For a discussion of the relationship of purpose and feedback to the operation of a system, see Stafford Beer, Cybernetics and Management (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), especially Part I, "Basic Notions," pp. 7-57. A related and fascinating thought would be to compare the disintegration of societies -- Greek, Roman, Turkish, etc. -- to the "Cybernetic Theory of Aging," demonstrating that it has been the failure of the feedback system to keep pace with internal growth and developments that accounts for the aging and ultimate incapacitation of societies and governments. Also, see David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965) which illustrates the applicability of systems analysis to the study of political systems.

[3] Cf. Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., Doubleday Short Studies in Political Science, SSPS #1, 1954).

democratic government in a given state could be graphically related to empirical data -- if it were available. The same cannot be done for the international system except in a very general way that would only repeat graphically the sort of verbal and written generalizations already known. That is to say, meaningful empirical data on common interests, common consensus and sense of community in the international system (rather than in the states of that system) would be most notable in demonstrating the absence of a sense of community and, therefore, an almost non-existent potential for democratic government at that level. In theory, of course, the same procedures and techniques would be applicable; there would, however, be very little to measure.

For example, one can conceive of a fair number of macro-level common interests that affect most people everywhere: concern for population pressures, elimination of poverty and disease, increasing world food supplies, combating large scale environmental pollution (insecticides, atomic debris, etc.), prevention of general or nuclear war, protection of scarce natural resources, and so forth. While these important common interests may have a substantial common consensus, all except for war and poverty can conceivably be handled within the system by a combination of national, bilateral, or international means. Thus, at best the bell

curve model of the international system would show a sharp spike and a regional lobe or two. Few common interests, little or no common consensus and, thus, very little sense of community. See Figure 25. An international government would necessarily be tyrannical.

One could argue more convincingly that there are some regions of the world where the base of common interests and common consensus is much broader than in the international system as a whole: for example, Western Europe, Canada-United States, the North Atlantic Basin, and Scandanavia.[4] But these examples all are in a single region or ocean basin with a uniquely common heritage and highly developed societies. Integration of some or all of these societies into a single (or several) larger societies is at least conceivable.[5] Other examples of regions with a credible potential for democratic government do not come to mind. There simply are very few places in the world where common interests and common consensus significantly outrun national boundaries. This raises the question: Can the process of community integration

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[4] Cf. Karl W. Deutsch, et al, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

[5] See Karl W. Deutsch, "Regional Organizations as a Path to Integration," The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), pp. 181-190; this chapter is primarily a review of post-World War II regional organization efforts in Western Europe.



Sense-of-Community in the International System

Figure 25.

now focused on national societies, be broadened to focus on geographic regions or, indeed, on the entire international community?[6] The next section will discuss the problem of expanding community.[7]

IV. COMMUNITY INTEGRATION: THE MASTER PROBLEM

Theories of community development and integration have been particularly prevalent in Western political thought since the Enlightenment. And practically all have had one thing in common: they have oversimplified the problem of achieving harmony among men by conceiving of the answer in monistic terms: they argued that there was but a single key to this age old problem and in accepting their answer the danger of conflict would be removed and survival and satisfaction would be ensured. No such easy answer has proven itself despite the fact that there may have seemed to many at the time (and, to some, even today) that there was considerable truth in the various hypotheses.

Rationalism was the father of many theories which were to follow. In the 18th century Enlightenment it seemed that no

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[6] Ibid., "Attaining and Maintaining Integration," pp. 191-202.

[7] Cf. R. W. VanWagenen, Research in the International Organization Field (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 1952), Chapter II, " 'Expanding Community' as a Research Focus."

problem was too great to withstand man's rational capacity. But the rationalists neglected to find in man's conduct what should have been most obvious: man also had -- and made use of -- an irrational capacity.

The Jacobins, obsessed in their struggle to eliminate the tyranny of the French monarchy, leaped to the totally unwarranted conclusion that all that stood between man and the achievement of harmony was the elimination of tyranny.

In like manner, Adam Smith saw in the "invisible hand" guiding the free market economy the easy road to a harmony that would spread deterministically to envelop the whole world -- if only restrictions to the free flow of trade were removed. And the laissez faire doctrine on which this was based was carried into the 19th century by a liberal movement which, operating in an environment of order but not recognizing its existence or necessity, conceived of harmony as the natural concomitant of liberating man's creative energies. Freedom defined as liberty was the easy path to universal harmony.

Karl Marx, looked beneath the pretensions of liberal theory, saw only the evils of unrestrained capitalism, and came up with his own over-simple answer: dialectical materialism was moving inexorably towards the elimination of the agent of oppression, the bourgeoisie and class interests, and only needed a helpful push to

speed the process. Universal proletarianism would remove classes and therefore class interests and the ugly aspects of man's nature would be transformed by the transcendent (and redemptive) act of proletarian revolution. Yet Marx overlooked the fact that if class interests indeed produced conflict, it was interests that produced the classes. The problem was more complicated than he realized.

Easy paths to partial and even universal harmony still persist. The "grand design" for an Atlantic Community assumes an overall harmony of interests that is at least in part a product of wishful thinking.[8]

The concept of supranationalism equates justice with law and a strong central authority. The need for development of the society to support such a political structure is seen as a consequence rather than a precondition.[9]

Functionalism seeks to develop the social substructure but at present its areas of competence are trivial compared to the

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[8] Compare the optimism of Joseph Kraft in The Grand Design (New York: Harper & Co., 1962) with the resistance of DeGaulle to Britain's entry into the E.E.C. and the U. S. role in NATO.

[9] For example, the "World Peace Through World Law" movement.

meaty concerns of national governments.[10]

And so on, with esperanto, education, technocracy, religion, and interculturalism. The problem of handling a diversity of factors typically has been reduced by ignoring many factors or by minimizing their effect.

Nonetheless, many proven integrative techniques are available. Language, religion, culture, tradition, and heritage are all means of creating common interests, though none has universal application. But at the same time such interests can be factors of diversity just because of the fact that they are non-universal. Language confronts language, religion vies with religion, culture with culture, and so on. Does this mean that sense of community can never be universal? Probably, but not necessarily. It has been the mistake of many scholars to unearth the important integrative factors at work in the past and to assume that they are the only ones which will be operative in the future. For example, the church, the family, language, culture, etc.

Today economic development is looked on as the definitive

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[10] For example, the specialized agencies of the United Nations deal with a number of problems which are of great concern to people as well as to governments. However, their resources and authority circumscribe any possibility that in the process of discharging their functions a larger sense of community will develop. Indeed, in Deutsch, op. cit., p. 4, the argument is made that this is "an age of substitutes" and that nations are less interdependent than ever before.

community building technique applicable to building national societies. Yet, for all its acceptance, it has yet to be proven in any underdeveloped society. Israel would be reassuring evidence except for the fact that the great number of common ties already existing at the time of statehood, the great financial support from without, the diversity of skills available to the new state made the case unique rather than similar to problems of the newly emerging nations. Taiwan and South Korea are other examples of nations that have made great economic progress but which already possessed societies of ancient standing and, besides, received exceptionally high infusions of foreign aid. And even were economic development proven effective in building national socieites, the problem of international integration would remain.

Conclusion

At the national level nowhere is there in operation a convincing theory for the rapid transformation of lesser-developed societies into integrated societies capable of supporting democratic government. [11]

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[11] This is not to belittle the very substantial efforts being made in many lesser-developed countries to build social and economic infrastructures, to plan economies, and to raise levels of education and training. However, with the exceptions of South Korea, Taiwan, and Israel previously mentioned the pace of development has been inadequate to prevent the gap between developed and under-developed from widening. This in turn produces political unrest and instability.

On a regional basis the European Common Market is the only area which offers promise of broadening the base of common interests in a region and of simultaneously expanding common consensus. At the international level, functional cooperation does not appear to be having an important integrative effect; and supranational efforts tend to assume that community development would take place as a consequence of government rather than forming the base for it.

V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The international system is composed of a number of interacting political communities responsive in various degrees to the individuals which make up their societies. The fact that these communities carry on relations with one another is evidence of the existence of some common interests; there is also, professedly, a sense of community of sorts. Therefore, the international community appears to be at least an inchoate community.

It appears to have as its assets some common interests, some sense of community, and some institutions of peaceful change. The task, it would seem, is that of creating more common interests, more sense of community, and more institutions of peaceful change.

Yet, in Chapter III it was observed that the international community represents a discontunuity in the hierarchy of people-

communities. It is a states-community and the interests with which states are concerned are national interests: sovereignty, power, prestige, equality, security, etc. And though these interests are asserted in the name of people -- the respective societies -- they in fact are designed to secure the survival of a form -- the state -- even though there is no such thing as a state except as it exists through the acts of people. A state cannot trust another state: only its officials can trust those of another. One state cannot have a sense of community for another; this can be manifested only through the sensibilities of persons through the medium of interests.

But persons acting for states limit and restrict the development of common interests between persons of different states. Thus there is and can be no lasting basis for common ties between states, unless common interests between individuals somehow can be enormously multiplied.

The international system is a misnomer or at least an overstatement. Too few interests, too little sense of community, and inadequate institutions show that it is only a framework for various sub-systems and cannot much change because of its fundamental nature.

At the same time, it can be argued that man is developing a

belief that he ought to be better served by his political institutions and that the strength of this belief gains as the communications revolution expands and intensifies. Many people even assume that man can be better served. The international system, then, is suspect not just because of its past catastrophic failures but also because as a system it is concerned primarily with the well being of states rather than of people. But man is concerned with both his survival and his well being and lacks confidence that the international system can ensure either or that it can avoid another world war and nuclear annihilation or that it can eliminate endemic conflict, hunger, and the grosser effects of poverty or that it can correct the maldistribution of technology and management expertise or that it can find a tolerable route to economic, social and political development of the lesser developed countries. In short, one senses that there is a growing gap between the capabilities of the system and the expectations/demands of people.

The international system has never had any responsibilities as a system, let alone the particular ones enumerated above. Just the same, people can argue that it ought to have had them and that it ought to have organized itself to better solve people problems. This is unlikely to occur. It seems more likely that major problems will be attacked by bilateral or multilateral actions.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

There have been three general objectives of this paper: (1) to construct a model of democracy that relates its promise to the interest structure of society; (2) to devise a graphical representation of the model that can serve as a useful proportioning device in assessing the potential of a society to support democratic government; and (3) to discuss in a speculative way the implications of the model for democracy at the international level.

I. THE COMMUNITY THEORY

The community theory has attempted to relate the individual to society normatively.[1] This has been a proximate endeavor and, as should be the case in all things political and social, it is purposely tentative. However, it is believed that as experience-derived changes are incorporated into the theory the framework derived from the idea of unity in diversity will undergo minimal transformation.

There are other political relationships which come to mind

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[1] Substantively, the norm is flexible. As was argued in Chapter III, the norm has evolved as a consequence of man's social existence rather than as a statement of abstract preference; he may not be aware of the nature of this pursuit, but the evidence of history can support the conclusion that man in society is, and has been, pursuing unity in diversity in the form of order in freedom.

when one reflects on that of individual to society: individual to government; individual to state; government to state; government to government; individual to international society; and states, governments and national societies both to the international system and to international society. But these relationships must not be considered in isolation from that of individual to society, since this is the most fundamental relationship in the hierarchy which begins with the individual and ends, now, with a community of legally equal and sovereign states. If the relationship of the individual to society can be identified with democracy and further related to a norm, then there exist grounds for hope (1) that democracy can be intelligently imported and (2) that the implications of democracy for the international system can be benefically understood.[2]

In other words, it has been argued that to the extent that governments or systems are not necessarily a logical evolution from the needs of society, or that a well-developed and integrated society is non-existent, or that a particular government chooses to ignore the needs and expressions of the society it governs, or that

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[2] No claim is made that democracy at the international level is feasible; the question is, what would it involve? How to proceed is a question one faces only if it is decided that proceeding is worthwhile.

there are poorly developed institutional links between government and society[3] -- then, to that extent, man will be frustrated in his pursuit of unity in diversity.

Nonetheless, the unrest and conflict which are characteristic of civilization demonstrate both the nature of the goal and its continued existence. Man is often diverted by theories which despair of the pursuit of unity in diversity and advocate acceptance of a life which is ordered but not free. Also, man is stirred to the passionate pursuit of liberty at the expense of order. Yet both extremes do acknowledge the fact that the other force is also contending within man; both extremes recognize that neither tyranny nor anarchy are acceptable conditions; but, just the same, man is forever to be found methodically introducing the one condition or the other and justifying his actions on the basis of pessimistic rationalization, if not self-serving argument.

In the past, society and government occasionally have been brought into a complementary relationship and a more tolerable balance of order and freedom has been the result. But as the conditions changed, man's inability to comprehend the complexities

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[3] It is recognized that one or another of these conditions has usually been the case over the space of recorded history, and that tyranny has been the "norm" of the individual-government relationship.

of his political and social environment -- and so to discover that the basis of the "good society" is a balance of order and freedom achieved through the medium of interest pursuit -- have often led him to actions which have destroyed the basis for such balance as had existed.

For as already noted, order and freedom are social creations growing out of interest pursuit. Tyranny is not a lot of order but, rather the absence of freedom; anarchy is not a lot of freedom, but, instead the absence of order. Pursuing this logic, it follows that tyranny may be diminished by increasing freedom rather than by reducing order; that anarchy may be diminished by increasing order rather than by curtailing freedom. Thus, because order and freedom are manifested in terms of interests and because a society is created through interest pursuit, the greater the number and diversity of interests and the more effectively interests are communicated, the greater the potential for order and freedom and the more stable the society.[4] Under these conditions, the relative importance of a single interest, or just a few, is much less to society as a whole than is the case when interests are few in number and diversity.

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[4] See Chapter III, p. 56. Also, Chapter V, pages 110 and 112.

On the other hand, a characteristic of the traditional autocratic state and most of the lesser developed countries is the narrow range of common interests pursued. This is why they can undergo such violent disruption as the result of a solitary event or issue -- the death of an important figure, cancellation of a large commercial agreement, the charismatic leadership of a demagogue, etc.

With respect to this traditional society and its narrow range of interests, it must be remembered that social instability is not necessarily a reflection on the government -- irrespective of whether its character is considered "good" or "bad" subjectively. For if a society is inherently unstable, governmental stability must be based to some extent on forces outside of society -- for example, an army or a national police force. Indeed, the application of democratic institutions and representative government to a traditional society affected by intense pressures for modernization, social change, and political self-expression simply ensure that the government will be precisely as unstable as its supporting society. It is the absence of internal interest pursuits which ensures a lack of order and thus keeps anarchy just around the corner. And it is also the absence of internal interest pursuits which ensures a lack of freedom and thus causes even necessary

governmental acts of self-survival to take on the appearance of tyranny.

Even highly developed democratic societies have been known to confuse liberty -- which is just a prerequisite for interest pursuit -- with freedom -- which is a social result of pursuing interests. Some groups in nearly all Western societies are prone to make this mistake, worshipping conspicuously at the altar of a "freedom" which is no more than a highly exaggerated expression of liberty.

On the other hand, the worship of order is a weakness of those who confuse it with restraint, failing to note that order, too, is interest derived. Thus authoritarian regimes typically do not appreciate the fact that it is not order which produces progress, but the pursuit of interests within a framework of order and freedom.

The community theory argument has attempted to place the foregoing complexities of social existence in a positive relationship to the universal norm of unity in diversity. The theory is oriented towards the notion that man lives in a problem-solving environment, that the most difficult problems are social in origin and that solutions are by nature relative rather than objective. Imperfection, ambiguity and ambivalence have been said to

characterize social existence and politics has been described as the process by which man, in light of the above, attempts to find purpose through the pursuit of unity in diversity in its order-freedom manifestation.

II. THE BELL CURVE MODEL

The bell curve model of Chapter IV simplifies the community theory argument of Chapter III in most respects but one: the addition of the bell curve as the norm of democratic society. The model, which can be used to compare one nation/society with another, is obviously of greater validity from a qualitative standpoint than from a quantitative standpoint. This is so because of the difficulty in devising uniform standards for interest identification where two or more different societies are involved. More research will be required to resolve this problem of data collection, interpretation and reconciliation.

In any event, no pretense is made that democracy can be objectified, quantified, and assigned numbers for bureaucrats to collect and store away. The model has its greatest value when used by the serious student to organize and interpret data with respect to states and societies under study.

III. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The bell curve model has served to emphasize one of man's

oldest reservations with respect to democracy: the problem of tyranny of or by a minority. If two or more groups, which appear to comprise a larger group, in fact are for the most part extra-social with respect to one another there is no governmental system yet devised which can be responsive to the interests of both or all the groups since by definition (of extra-sociality) they lack a substantial area of common interest. Because the justification for legal jurisdiction is directly related to intra-social situations,[5] it follows that for an unrepresented group within society no legal regime can be just even though the legal principles are, from an objective standpoint, equally applicable.

James Madison labored with the problem of tyranny within a democracy in The Federalist Papers[6] when he considered the problem of tyranny and the dangers of concentration of power. His answer, in effect, was to assume that factions, and hence the danger of tyranny, could not be avoided and to devise a system of checks and balances to protect against the abuse of power. In effect, his concept of society was that it was inherently multi-lobed; he did

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[5] See Constantine Kojouharoff, Niccolo Machiavelli (Washington, D.C.: National University Law Review, 1930), pp. 40-41.

[6] The Federalist Papers (New York: New American Library (Mentor Books), 1961), No. 9, No. 10, No. 39, Nos. 47-51, especially.

not recognize the possibility of interests creating a single-lobe society.

Jean Jacques Rosseau implicitly recognized the relationship of democratic government and single lobe sense of community when he theorized that a democratic community was necessarily limited in size.[7] Both of these views have implications for democracy at the international level.

It is plainly utopian to expect the development of a world society linked by common interests of such number and quality as to create a single lobe sense of community which approaches the bell curve norm. And even if development appeared feasible, it would appear to challenge theories of span-of-attention (as regards the individual) and span-of-control (as regards government).

Given the diversity of social forms in the world and the absence of any mandate to reduce this diversity, it would appear desirable to preserve the international system. But what of the fact that the member states are, in effect, extra-social with respect to one another?

Here we finally are brought face to face with the reality that

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[7] Rousseau was concerned with the necessity for an individual to represent himself: Jean Jacques Rousseau, "The Social Contract," Section 17 in William Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers (N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1961), pp. 460-462.

there is no good solution to the problem of democracy at the international level. The international system is indicated because the idea of a universal society which could support supranational democratic government is, at the moment, impossible to conceive. Even though a rudimentary universal value system were to evolve, it still would be necessary to preserve a buffer between the various social groupings of the world with their widely differing cultures, levels of social integration, and attitudes towards government. One can hope, however, that the Madisonian solution of checks and balances will eventually find expression in the international system and in so doing allow for the preservation of international diversity while promising a greater measure of international unity.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Samuel P. Huntington closes his book, The Common Defense, by quoting Fisher Ames:

> A monarchy or despotism...is like a full-rigged sailing ship. It moves swiftly and efficiently. It is beautiful to behold. It responds sharply to the helm. But in troubled waters, when it strikes a rock, its shell is pierced, and it quickly sinks to the bottom. A republic, however, is like a raft: slow, ungainly, impossible to steer, no place from which to control events, and yet endurable and safe. It will not sink, but one's feet are always wet.[8]

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[8] Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 447.

Ames made his remarks in 1795 yet the insight they reflect seems as valid today as then. Making democracy work will never be easy nor will the effort be glamorous. But the creation of democratic societies is necessary to the balancing of order and freedom and -- ultimately -- to the attainment of unity in diversity. And if "one's feet are always wet" in this pursuit at the national level, one can hardly expect the pursuit of unity in diversity at the international level to be drier.

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